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Policing Immigration 
Adam B. Cox† & Thomas J. Miles†† 
INTRODUCTION 
Today, local police are being integrated into federal immi-
gration enforcement on a scale never seen before in American 
history. This transformation of immigration law is not the result 
of the high-profile efforts by Arizona and a few other states to 
regulate migrants. Instead, it is the product of a largely over-
looked federal program known as “Secure Communities.” 
Launched three years ago, the program’s goal is simple: to check 
the immigration status of every single person arrested by local 
police anywhere in the country. 
Secure Communities represents the future of immigration 
enforcement. It dramatically lowers the information cost of iden-
tifying immigration violators, accelerates the ongoing conver-
gence of the immigration and criminal bureaucracies in the 
United States, and reshapes the structure of immigration feder-
alism. Despite its significance, however, little is known about 
the program. 
This Article, part of a larger project providing the first 
large-scale empirical evaluation of Secure Communities, uses 
the program’s rollout to explore a pervasive feature of criminal 
and administrative law that rarely lends itself to empirical exami-
nation—the role of discretion in policing. The breadth of discretion 
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wielded by police and prosecutors is probably the single most 
important feature of modern law enforcement. Controlling that 
discretion—through judicial intervention, administrative design, 
and so on—has consequently become the central preoccupation 
of criminal and administrative law scholarship. For all that at-
tention, however, we often have little sense of how law enforce-
ment officials actually wield the discretion they possess. Anecdo-
tal accounts abound, but systemic empirical evidence is rarely 
available. This is even truer with respect to immigration en-
forcement, which represents one of the largest and least studied 
law enforcement bureaucracies in the United States. 
Secure Communities’ rollout provides a unique opportunity 
to study the role of discretion in immigration enforcement. 
While the program is designed to check the immigration status 
of anyone arrested by local police anywhere in the country, re-
source limitations forced the federal government to stagger the 
program’s activation across the country. Rather than activating 
the program simultaneously nationwide, Immigration and Cus-
toms Enforcement (ICE) rolled out the program on a county-by-
county basis. As one would expect, senior administrators faced 
with limited resources made the explicit decision to target high-
priority counties for early activation. The pattern of activation 
therefore provides a revealing look into the enforcement agen-
cy’s priorities, showing us where around the country the gov-
ernment chose to concentrate its limited immigration resources. 
Public debate about Secure Communities points to three po-
tential sets of priorities that might have driven the geography of 
rollout. ICE has said repeatedly that Secure Communities is a 
tool for preventing crime and removing serious “criminal aliens” 
from the country. That justification suggests that counties with 
the most serious crime problems and the largest number of 
noncitizens engaged in crime would be targeted for early activa-
tion. While crime is the putative focus, however, Secure Com-
munities also makes enforcement cheaper by lowering the in-
formation cost of identifying immigration violators. Critics of the 
program have argued that this is the program’s real aim—to 
identify cheaply more people in violation of immigration law 
whom the agency can then deport. If true, this priority should 
lead the agency to target the program at areas with high levels 
of immigration violators, rather than high levels of criminal of-
fenders. Finally, many have suggested that bureaucrats worry 
as much about the political costs of their choices as they do the 
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policy consequences. If this were true for those in charge of Se-
cure Communities, we would expect that they would target acti-
vation in local communities that support the program while de-
laying activation in counties where the program might produce 
political backlash.  
We test these three hypotheses about the use of discretion 
using the program’s rollout data and extensive data regarding 
local crime rates, demography, and partisan politics. The analy-
sis leads to three principal conclusions. First, the data under-
mine the government’s claim that Secure Communities is prin-
cipally about making communities more secure from crime. 
High-crime areas were, surprisingly, not a priority in the rollout. 
It is very difficult to square the lack of any meaningful correla-
tion between early activation and local crime rates with the gov-
ernment’s putative desire to target immigration enforcement re-
sources in a manner designed to reduce the incidence of serious 
crime by noncitizens. 
Second, the data provide little support for the claim that the 
agency’s use of discretion was driven more by local politics than 
federal policy. Many critics of local police involvement in immi-
gration enforcement have argued that incorporating local police 
will result in the tail wagging the dog, with local governments 
determining immigration priorities. Whatever the force of this 
concern in contexts like Arizona v United States,1 where Arizona 
wanted to involve itself in immigration enforcement without fed-
eral authorization, it does not appear to have much purchase 
here. There is little evidence that the pattern of rollout reflected 
local attitudes about immigration enforcement rather than fed-
eral priorities. This does not mean that politics were irrelevant: 
as we will see, proximity to the border was a powerful predictor 
of early activation, and some readers will likely see this prioriti-
zation as a reflection of politics rather than strictly policy. None-
theless, there is little support for our first or third hypotheses. 
Third, and perhaps most important, the data reveal that 
early activation in the program correlates strongly with whether 
a county has a large Hispanic population. This finding can be 
seen as support for the hypothesis that the rollout prioritized lo-
cations thought to have high levels of immigration violators, 
given both the demographics and politics of unauthorized migra-
tion. It is crucial to note, however, that the pattern of correlation 
 
 1 132 S Ct 2492 (2012). 
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between rollout and a community’s Hispanic population persists 
even when we control for myriad other factors that might also be 
thought to be proxies for suspected immigration violators, such 
as a county’s proximity to the border or its noncitizen or foreign-
born population. Moreover, other demographic proxies for immi-
gration violators, such as the local noncitizen or foreign-born 
population, predict the rollout sequence much less well than 
Hispanic population. These findings raise important questions 
about racial profiling in immigration enforcement. While the da-
ta should not be interpreted as evidence that the government in-
tentionally singled out predominantly Hispanic communities for 
increased immigration enforcement, ICE’s discretionary alloca-
tion of resources had the effect of concentrating enforcement in 
these communities. 
As the exercise of discretion in immigration enforcement be-
comes more centralized within the immigration bureaucracy, 
patterns like the ones we find raise questions identical to those 
at the heart of debates in criminal justice today. In the arena of 
criminal justice, risk-based models of crime prevention have led 
to strategies like the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk program—a pro-
gram that has renewed the focus in criminal law scholarship on 
questions about which communities bear the brunt of the costs 
of crime prevention strategies. The pattern of Secure Communi-
ties’ rollout suggests the need to start a parallel conversation 
about immigration enforcement. More generally, it highlights 
the oft-overlooked similarities between the structure of modern 
criminal and immigration enforcement—similarities that should 
lead, but have not yet led, to the integration of scholarship on 
the two subjects. 
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides back-
ground on Secure Communities and the broader ongoing inte-
gration of criminal and immigration enforcement. Part II lays 
out and tests our hypotheses. Part III explores the implications 
of our findings. 
I.  INTEGRATING THE CRIMINAL AND IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
SYSTEMS 
Immigration and crime have been intimately linked in Amer-
ican law and politics for over a century. In 1875, the first restric-
tive immigration law passed by the federal government prohibited 
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the entry of certain criminals and suspected prostitutes.2 When 
Congress began adopting deportation laws in the early twenti-
eth century, “criminal aliens” were again among the first target-
ed by the government.3 And over the last twenty-five years the 
focus on deporting those who commit crimes has expanded dra-
matically. Today a broad swath of criminal convictions can make a 
noncitizen deportable—convictions ranging from serious offenses 
such as murder to minor drug crimes and other misdemeanors.4 
While the connection between criminal convictions and im-
migration consequences is nearly as old as federal immigration 
law itself, over the last few decades a new sort of connection has 
developed between immigration law and criminal law. This new 
linkage concerns the enforcement bureaucracies of criminal and 
immigration law, rather than the primary rules of conduct that 
regulate noncitizens. 
There is a growing convergence between the enforcement 
systems for immigration law and criminal law. This convergence 
is at odds with an old, conventional view about these regulatory 
domains. According to this old view, criminal law is the province 
of the states while immigration law is exclusively within the 
control of the federal government. The old view was really never 
quite right.5 Nonetheless, it was prominent in both regulatory 
practice and academic commentary for many decades. Recently, 
however, a host of factors—including a rise in unauthorized im-
migration and new thinking about cooperative federalism—have 
 
 2 Page Act of 1875 § 1, ch 141, 18 Stat 477. The statute prohibited certain felons 
and prostitutes from immigrating to the United States and criminalized the importation 
of prostitutes and “cooly” labor. Page Act §§ 3–5, 18 Stat at 477–48. 
 3 See, for example, Immigration Act of 1917 § 19, Pub L No 64-301, ch 29, 39 Stat 
874, 889–90: 
[Making deportable] any alien who is hereafter sentenced to imprisonment for 
a term of one year or more because of conviction in this country of a crime in-
volving moral turpitude, committed within five years after the entry of the al-
ien to the United States, or who is hereafter sentenced more than once to such 
a term of imprisonment because of conviction in this country of any crime in-
volving moral turpitude, committed at any time after entry. 
See also Immigration Act of 1907 § 3, Pub L No 59-96, ch 1134, 34 Stat 898, 899–900 
(making deportable women who engaged in prostitution within three years after enter-
ing the United States). 
 4 See Adam B. Cox and Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigra-
tion Law, 59 Stan L Rev 809, 836–39 (2007). 
 5 For a discussion of the old view and the argument that it was not correct, see 
Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776–1875), 93 
Colum L Rev 1833, 1839–40 (1993). 
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led to two prominent developments that challenge this neat di-
vision of labor. 
The first development is the rise of state and local efforts to 
combat unlawful migration. Examples include Texas’s attempt 
in the 1970s to deny free public school education to undocu-
mented children,6 California’s bid in the 1990s to deny a variety 
of government benefits to all out-of-status noncitizens,7 and the 
recent efforts by Arizona and a handful of other states to arrest, 
prosecute, and otherwise single out potentially deportable immi-
grants for disfavorable treatment.8 These efforts have been 
largely unsuccessful. Many efforts were blocked in their entire-
ty: the Supreme Court struck down Texas’s statute in Plyler v 
Doe9 as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause,10 and lower 
courts initially blocked California’s Proposition 187 before the 
state abandoned its defense of the law.11 More recently, the Su-
preme Court rebuffed Arizona’s high-profile effort to get in-
volved in enforcing immigration law. In the summer of 2012, the 
Court struck down all but one of the central provisions of Arizo-
na’s SB 1070,12 handing a big victory to the federal government 
and reaffirming a strong view of federal supremacy over immi-
gration policy.13  
While these state and local initiatives have garnered most of 
the public and scholarly attention, they are in some ways a side-
show to a second development: the federal government’s incor-
poration of the state criminal enforcement bureaucracy into the 
federal immigration enforcement system. This incorporation, 
which has roots that date back many decades, began picking up 
speed in the 1990s, when Congress passed a statute authorizing 
the attorney general to deputize state and local law enforcement 
 
 6 See 1975 Tex Sess Law Serv 896, codified at Tex Educ Code Ann § 21.031 
(Vernon 1975), invalidated by Plyler v Doe, 457 US 202 (1982). 
 7 See 1994 Cal Legis Serv Prop 187 (West). 
 8 See, for example, Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act 
(SB 1070), 2010 Ariz Sess Laws 113, as amended by HB 2162, 2010 Ariz Sess Laws 211.  
 9 457 US 202 (1982). 
 10 Id at 230. 
 11 See League of United Latin American Citizens v Wilson, 997 F Supp 1244, 1261 
(CD Cal 1997); Patrick J. McDonnell, Davis Won’t Appeal Prop. 187 Ruling, Ending 
Court Battles, LA Times A1 (July 29, 1999). 
 12 2010 Ariz Sess Laws 113. 
 13 Arizona, 132 S Ct at 2510. 
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officials to enforce immigration law.14 Under this statutory pro-
vision, § 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 
the attorney general has authorized local police in nearly seven-
ty-five jurisdictions around the country to screen prisoners for 
immigration violations and, in some cases, to assist in street-
level immigration enforcement.15 These cooperative arrange-
ments have been complemented by the Criminal Alien Program 
(CAP), under which federal immigration agents (rather than lo-
cal police) interview arrestees in federal, state, and local jails 
and prisons to identify potentially deportable noncitizens.16 As of 
early 2009, all foreign-born prisoners in roughly 14 percent of lo-
cal jails and prisons were screened by ICE agents.17 
Secure Communities, a new program launched in the fall of 
2008, builds on these preliminary efforts at cooperative federal-
ism. Its basic aim is in some ways quite similar to the earlier 
programs: like CAP and most 287(g) agreements, the goal is to 
provide immigration screening for people arrested by local law 
enforcement. But the scale of the program is dramatically differ-
ent. While 287(g) agreements were in effect in fewer than seventy-
five jurisdictions, and CAP was limited to screening prisoners in 
a tiny fraction of local jails (and then only if the prisoners had 
already been identified as foreign-born), Secure Communities is 
vastly more ambitious: under the program, every single person 
arrested by a local law enforcement official anywhere in the 
country will soon be screened by the federal government for im-
migration violations. In short, Secure Communities is the larg-
est expansion of local involvement in immigration enforcement 
in the nation’s history.18 
 
 14 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 § 133, 
Pub L No 104-208, 110 Stat 3009, 3009-563 to -564, amending INA § 287(g), codified as 
amended at 8 USC § 1357(g).  
 15 See Randy Capps, et al, Delegation and Divergence: A Study of 287(g) State and 
Local Immigration Enforcement 9 (Migration Policy Institute Jan 2011), online at http:// 
www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/287g-divergence.pdf (visited Mar 4, 2013). 
 16 See Maureen A. Sweeney, Fact or Fiction: The Legal Construction of Immigration 
Removal for Crimes, 27 Yale J Reg 47, 73 (2010). 
 17 See ICE, Secure Communities: Quarterly Report; Fiscal Year 2009 Report to Con-
gress—First Quarter 3 (Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Feb 17, 2009), online at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/congressionalstatusreportfy091stquarter 
.pdf (visited Mar 4, 2013). 
 18 The program appears set to supplant some of the earlier, more limited efforts at 
cooperation. For example, as this Article went to press the Obama administration an-
nounced that it would not renew any of its existing 287(g) agreements that operate on 
the task-force model, as opposed to the jail-screening model, instead letting them expire 
at the end of 2012. See ICE, News Release, FY 2012: ICE Announces Year-End Removal 
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To provide screening in local jails and prisons, Secure 
Communities relies on a fundamentally different—and much 
less labor-intensive—approach than 287(g) agreements or CAP. 
Those programs required individual police officers or ICE agents 
to interview each prisoner personally in order to collect infor-
mation and assess the person’s status.19 In contrast, the back-
bone of Secure Communities is an information-sharing ar-
rangement that permits ICE to use biometric identification to 
flag suspected immigration violators. 
Traditionally, whenever a person is arrested and booked by 
a state or local law enforcement agency, his fingerprints are 
taken and forwarded electronically to the FBI. The FBI com-
pares those prints against various national criminal information 
databases that return a “hit” if the person has a criminal history 
or outstanding warrants.20 Under Secure Communities, the fed-
eral government forwards to the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity (DHS) the fingerprints already being routed to the FBI. 
DHS then compares the person’s fingerprints against prints in 
the Automated Biometric Identification System (known within 
the agency as IDENT)—a large immigration database compiled 
by DHS over the last few decades and into which, in theory, the 
agency inputs the fingerprints of every noncitizen fingerprinted 
as part of any of the agency’s mission-related activities.21 If the 
 
Numbers, Highlights Focus on Key Priorities and Issues New National Detainer Guid-
ance to Further Focus Resources (DHS Dec 21, 2012), online at http://www.ice.gov/news/ 
releases/1212/121221washingtondc2.htm#statement (visited Mar 4, 2013). See also Ted 
Hesson, As One Immigration Enforcement Program Fades Away, Another Rises, ABC 
News (Dec 27, 2012), online at http://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/News/immigration 
-enforcement-program-287g-scaled-back/story?id=18077757 (visited Mar 4, 2013). Ex-
plaining this decision, DHS emphasized that “ICE has concluded that other enforcement 
programs, including Secure Communities, are a more efficient use of resources for focus-
ing on priority cases.” ICE, News Release, ICE Announces Year-End Removal Numbers 
(cited in note 18). 
 19 For many years CAP therefore required ICE agents to travel to each local jail for 
interviews. In recent years in-person interviews have been replaced in some instances by 
remote interviews via telephone or videoconferencing equipment. But this streamlining 
still requires an available staff of ICE agents to conduct the interviews remotely—a need 
that led to the creation of the Detention Enforcement and Processing Offenders by Remote 
Technology (DEPORT) Center in Chicago—and, for videoconferencing, requires the instal-
lation of equipment in each local jail. See Sweeney, 27 Yale J Reg at 73 (cited in note 16). 
 20 See David J. Venturella, Secure Communities: Identifying and Removing Crimi-
nal Aliens, The Police Chief 40, 43 (Sept 2010). 
 21 As this description should make clear, IDENT is importantly different than the 
criminal history databases relied on by the FBI. The National Crime Information Center 
(NCIC)—the FBI’s database—includes, in theory, only information about suspected and 
convicted criminals. See FBI, National Crime Information Center, online at http://www 
.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ncic (visited Mar 4, 2013). IDENT is much broader because by design 
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database returns a hit, indicating that the arrestee’s finger-
prints are in the database, ICE’s Law Enforcement Support 
Center (LESC) assesses the person’s status using all available 
information in order to determine whether the arrestee is in vio-
lation of immigration law, perhaps because he has overstayed 
his visa or because he has been previously deported and has not 
been legally readmitted to the country. The ICE district office 
then decides whether to place a detainer on the person.22 The de-
tainer requests that the local agency hold the person for forty-
eight hours in order to permit ICE to transfer the person to fed-
eral custody for the initiation of deportation proceedings.23 
Secure Communities thus uses information sharing and bio-
metric identity matching to dramatically reduce the labor re-
quired to screen arrestees. Nonetheless, while the technology 
made it conceivable that ICE could screen every arrestee in the 
country, it did not entirely automate the process of identifying 
and charging those believed to be in violation of immigration 
law. Database matches must still be evaluated by ICE agents 
trained to determine whether a noncitizen flagged by the data-
base can be charged with being removable—a process that re-
quires technicians at ICE’s LESC to compile and analyze infor-
mation from multiple databases, and may even require an 
 
it includes records for all noncitizens fingerprinted by DHS. This includes known and 
suspected immigration violators, such as those who have been arrested by ICE, placed in 
removal proceedings, or previously removed to another country. But it also includes law-
ful immigrants, such as those who have been fingerprinted at a point of entry to the 
United States or when they applied for immigration benefits while residing in the United 
States. See US Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program (US-VISIT), 
Biometric Standards Requirements for US-VISIT: Version 1.0 1 (DHS Mar 15, 2010), online 
at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/usvisit/usvisit_biometric_standards.pdf (visited Mar 
4, 2013); Privacy Impact Assessment for the Automated Biometric Identification System 
(IDENT) 2 (DHS July 31, 2006), online at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/ 
privacy/privacy_pia_usvisit_ident_final.pdf (visited Mar 4, 2013). Because the database 
includes lawful immigrants, and even some immigrants who have since naturalized, a 
match in the database is not itself conclusive evidence that the arrestee is potentially 
deportable. Moreover, because some unlawful migrants have never had contact with 
ICE—most importantly, those who snuck into the country and have never been cap-
tured—a no-match in the database is not conclusive evidence that the person is a citizen 
or lawfully present. 
 22 See ICE, Secure Communities: Quarterly Report; First Quarter FY 2009 at 3–4 (cit-
ed in note 17); ICE, 1st Quarterly Status Report (April–June 2008) for Secure Communities: 
A Comprehensive Plan to Identify and Remove Criminal Aliens 7 (DHS Aug 2008), online at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/congressionalstatusreportfy081stquarter 
.pdf (visited Mar 4, 2013). 
 23 See 8 CFR § 287.7. 
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interview of the suspect.24 Even if the suspect is deemed remov-
able, local ICE offices must still determine whether charging the 
suspect is consistent with the agency’s use of prosecutorial dis-
cretion. These determinations must be made quickly enough for 
ICE to take action to apprehend the suspect while he remains in 
local police custody. For suspects who will be detained during 
removal proceedings, ICE must locate transportation resources 
and bed space necessary to take the person into custody.25 These 
resource bottlenecks—combined with certain other technological 
challenges and the sheer scope of the task of communicating 
with the roughly thirty-one thousand booking locations around 
the country—all but guaranteed that simultaneous nationwide 
activation of Secure Communities was not an option.26 
Instead, ICE rolled out the program, county by county, over 
the course of the last four years. The first handful of counties 
was activated on October 27, 2008.27 Each month new counties 
 
 24 See ICE, 1st Quarterly Status Report (April–June 2008) at 7 (cited in note 22). 
For this reason, Secure Communities’ relationship to the CAP program is quite compli-
cated. It can be seen as a successor program to CAP, as a program operating in tandem 
with CAP, or as a biometric component of CAP itself, and agency documents sometimes 
describe the relationship between the programs in each of these three ways. See Is Se-
cure Communities Keeping Our Communities Secure? Hearing before the Subcommittee 
on Immigration Policy and Enforcement of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 112th 
Cong, 1st Sess 8, 11–13 (2011) (statement of Gary Mead, Executive Associate Director for 
Enforcement and Removal Operations, ICE) (“Secure Communities Oversight Hearing”); 
ICE, Secure Communities: A Comprehensive Plan to Identify and Remove Criminal Al-
iens; Strategic Plan 2–3 (DHS July 21, 2009), online at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/ 
secure_communities/securecommunitiesstrategicplan09.pdf (visited Mar 4, 2013); ICE, 
1st Quarterly Status Report (April–June 2008) at 2 (cited in note 22). 
 25 See ICE, Second Congressional Status Report Covering the Fourth Quarter Fiscal 
Year 2008 for Secure Communities: A Comprehensive Plan to Identify and Remove Crim-
inal Aliens 20–23 (DHS Nov 7, 2008), online at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure 
_communities/congressionalstatusreportfy084thquarter.pdf (visited Mar 4, 2013); ICE, 
1st Quarterly Status Report (April–June 2008) at 7 (cited in note 22). 
 26 See ICE, Second Congressional Status Report: Fourth Quarter FY 2008 at 9–10 
(cited in note 25); ICE, 1st Quarterly Status Report (April–June 2008) at 7 (cited in note 
22). The technological hurdles included the fact that many local jurisdictions did not 
have live scan fingerprint devices when the rollout commenced in 2008. See ICE, Second 
Congressional Status Report: Fourth Quarter FY 2008 at 10–11 (cited in note 25). 
 27 See ICE, Secure Communities: IDENT/IAFIS Interoperability; Monthly Statis-
tics through September 30, 2011 1 (DHS Oct 14, 2011), online at http://www.ice.gov/ 
doclib/foia/sc-stats/nationwide_interoperability_stats-fy2011-to-date.pdf (visited Mar 4, 
2013); ICE, Secure Communities: Quarterly Report; First Quarter FY 2009 at 4–5 (cited 
in note 17). Prior to that date, ICE operated a pilot program in a handful of counties in 
order to prepare for broader deployment. ICE, Secure Communities: Quarterly Report; 
First Quarter FY 2009 at 4 (cited in note 17) (listing Boston, MA; Dallas County, TX; 
Harris County, TX; Wake County, NC; Henderson County, NC; Buncombe County, NC; 
and Gaston County, NC as early participants). 
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have been added, and as of August 2012, 3,074 counties—almost 
97 percent of all of the counties in the United States—had been 
incorporated into Secure Communities.28 Only 107 counties re-
mained to be activated at the close of August, and ICE stated in 
May that it planned to activate all remaining stragglers in short 
order—well ahead of the rollout’s initial timetable.29 
While Secure Communities’ activation has been staggered 
rather than simultaneous, the decision about which counties to 
activate first has been entirely the federal government’s. This is 
also quite a departure from the earlier efforts at cooperative 
immigration enforcement, such as the 287(g) program. Under 
that program, individual states and local governments them-
selves decided whether they wanted to opt into the program. Un-
less both the local government and the Department of Justice 
agreed on the terms of cooperation, no arrangement under 
§ 287(g) was possible.30 In contrast, under Secure Communities 
counties are selected for activation by DHS regardless of wheth-
er they wish to participate.31 Moreover, once activated, a local 
law enforcement agency has no real means of shirking or other-
wise declining to participate in the program. As we explained 
above, the fingerprints that form the basis of the biometric iden-
tity check in Secure Communities are the very same fingerprint 
records that are provided by the local law enforcement agency to 
the FBI for purposes of criminal background checks. There is no 
way for a local government to forward these fingerprints for 
criminal purposes but prevent the FBI from sharing them with 
DHS. As a result, the only way for a local law enforcement agen-
cy to prevent the immigration check from taking place would be 
to stop fingerprinting altogether suspects who are arrested and 
booked into custody. It goes without saying that this is not an 
option for local law enforcement.32 
 
 28 See ICE, Activated Jurisdictions (DHS Aug 22, 2012), online at https://www.ice 
.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/sc-activated2.pdf (visited Mar 4, 2013). 
 29 See Julia Preston, Despite Opposition, Immigration Agency to Expand Finger-
print Program, NY Times A10 (May 12, 2012). 
 30 INA § 287(g), 8 USC § 1357(g). 
 31 See Julia Preston, Resistance Widens to Obama Initiative on Criminal Immi-
grants, NY Times A11 (Aug 13, 2011). 
 32 To be clear, we do not mean to suggest that there is nothing that local govern-
ments can do to resist the program. As one of us has written about elsewhere, and as we 
are exploring in other aspects of this project, local law enforcement agencies could resist 
participation by changing their arrest or bail practices. See Adam B. Cox and Eric A. 
Posner, Delegation in Immigration Law, 79 U Chi L Rev 1285, 1344–49 (2012). 
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The mandatory nature of Secure Communities was not ini-
tially made public.33 When it was, swift criticism followed by 
some public officials and civil rights organizations.34 Nonethe-
less, this feature of the program is advantageous from a re-
search perspective. Because state and local governments cannot 
decline activation as a legal matter or avoid participation as a 
practical matter, activation provides more complete information 
about the federal government’s priorities. 
To provide an initial sense of the deliberate nature of DHS’s 
selection of communities for activation, Figure 1 shows the se-
quence of county activations each month from October 2008 
through July 2012. The left scale reports the number of new ac-
tivations in each month; the right reports the cumulative num-
ber of activated counties. The program spread slowly in its first 
eighteen months. During that period, twenty or fewer counties 
were activated in each month. After a sharp spike in activations 
in June 2010, the program spread more rapidly. During the sec-
ond eighteen months of the program, nearly one hundred coun-
ties were activated in each month. By the summer of 2011, 
roughly half of counties nationwide had been activated. Begin-
ning in October 2011 and continuing to May 2012, the pace of 
activations accelerated once again. During this period, more 
than one hundred counties were activated in each month. By the 
summer of 2012, the number of monthly activations fell precipi-
tously, with no activations occurring in some months, because 
very few counties that had not already been activated remained. 
 
 33 See Office of Inspector General, Communication Regarding Participation in Se-
cure Communities 4 (DHS Mar 2012), online at http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/ 
2012/OIG_12-66_Mar12.pdf (visited Mar 4, 2013) (detailing the failure of DHS to provide 
clear guidance to the public and state and local governments regarding the mandatory 
nature of the program). 
 34 See, for example, Insecure Communities: Press Packet; Uncovering the Truth and 
Understanding the Deceptive Deportation Program *4–11 (National Day Laborer Organ-
izing Network (NDLON) 2011), online at http://ndlon.org/pdf/scommbrief.pdf (visited 
Mar 4, 2013); Uncover the Truth: ICE and Police Collaborations (Center for Constitution-
al Rights, NDLON, and Cardozo Law School 2012), online at http://uncoverthetruth.org 
(visited Mar 4, 2013). Part of what generated confusion about the mandatory nature was 
that DHS initially adopted a practice of entering into Memoranda of Understanding with 
state governments (though not with local governments or law enforcement agencies) pri-
or to activation. As soon as some states began to resist signing these agreements, howev-
er, the government made clear that the agreements were not required because the pro-
gram required no actions by state or local officials; all that was required was a rerouting 
of the fingerprint data stream among the federal agencies. See Preston, Resistance Widens, 
NY Times at A11 (cited in note 31); Insecure Communities at *4–11 (cited in note 34). 
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By July 2012, the end of our study period, 97 percent of counties 
were active participants in Secure Communities. 
FIGURE 1.  NUMBER OF COUNTIES ACTIVATED UNDER SECURE 
COMMUNITIES: OCTOBER 28, 2008–JULY 31, 2012 
While Figure 1 shows how the pace of activation has accel-
erated over time, what it cannot show is the dramatic way in 
which early and late activations differed. Figure 2 highlights 
these changes by mapping the cumulative activations in each 
twelve-month period following the beginning of the rollout. As 
the maps make clear, over time activations became much lumpi-
er, with multiple counties within the same state frequently acti-
vated on the same date. During the program’s first year the 
number of monthly activations was quite small. With such small 
numbers, it was rare for multiple counties within the same state 
to activate at the same time. Instead, scattered counties around 
the country were singled out for activation. As the rollout of the 
program progressed, however, it became increasingly common 
for several counties within one state to be activated simultane-
ously. And over time, more and more of these mass activations 
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had the effect of bringing all the remaining inactive counties 
within a state into Secure Communities. In other words, early in 
the program’s rollout activations can truly be characterized as 
county by county, while at the tail end of the rollout some acti-
vations were nearly statewide events. 
FIGURE 2.  PATTERN OF SECURE COMMUNITIES ACTIVATION  
 
 
To get a better numerical sense for this pattern of mass ac-
tivations, Table 1 reports the frequency of simultaneous activa-
tion events according to the proportion of counties within a state 
activated simultaneously and how far into Secure Communities’ 
rollout the activation event occurred. The pattern is unmistaka-
ble. Mass activation events have become increasingly frequent 
as Secure Communities has neared its goal of nationwide cover-
age. For example, consider instances in which at least half of the 
counties in a state activated on the same day and, in so doing, 
brought the entire state into active status. No such events oc-
curred during the first year of the program, but they have be-
come increasingly frequent during later years. During the sec-
ond year of the program, such mass-activation events occurred 
in two states and involved forty-six counties, which constituted 8 
percent of counties activated during that year. During the third 
year of the program, such mass-activation events occurred in 5 
states, and they included 208 counties, or 23 percent of all coun-
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ties activated during that period. In the last 10 months included 
in this study, such mass activations occurred in 26 states, en-
compassing 1,328 counties—over 90 percent of counties activat-
ed during that period. And as Table 1 shows, the pattern re-
mains unchanged regardless of the threshold chosen to define 
mass-activation events; raising it to 75 percent of a state’s coun-
ties or lowering it to 25 percent does not alter the conclusion 
that early activations show a distinctly different pattern than 
later activations. 
Figures 1 and 2, as well as Table 1, thus reveal a distinct 
evolution in the pattern of activation. In the first eighteen 
months or so of the program, the pace of activations was slow, 
and early activations tended to pick off one or two counties with-
in a state. The government did not seek to activate an entire 
state before moving on to another state. Instead, it carefully se-
lected just one or two counties in each state for activation. Later 
on, as the pace of activations sped up, the process of selecting 
counties for activation clearly changed. The government did not 
simply accelerate the activation of scattered counties. Instead, 
the government shifted to mass activations in which all inactive 
counties remaining in a state were activated on the same date. 
This manner of activation implied a much quicker rate of adop-
tion; in the last twelve months of our observation period, more 
counties were activated than during the first thirty months of 
the program. It also suggests that early activations were more 
deliberate and targeted. 
05 COX-MILES_SYMP_FLIP (FIXED).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/3/2013 8:43 AM 
102  The University of Chicago Law Review [80:87 
   
TABLE 1.  FREQUENCY OF MASS ACTIVATIONS BRINGING ENTIRE 
STATE INTO ACTIVE STATUS 
 Months since Launch of Secure  
Communities in October 2008 
 
Percent of Counties in the State  
Activating on Same Date 
12 or fewer 
months 
(1) 
13–24 
months 
(2) 
25–36 
months 
(3) 
37–46 
months 
(4) 
25%     
 Number of Counties in Mass  
  Activation 
0 92 213 1,438 
 Counties in Mass Activations as 
  a Percentage of All Counties 
  Activated in this Period 
0 16.2% 23.7% 97.6% 
 Number of States Brought into 
  Complete Activation through 
  These Mass Activations 
0 3 7 30 
50%     
 Number of Counties in Mass  
  Activation 
0 46 208 1,328 
 Counties in Mass Activations as 
  a Percentage of All Counties 
  Activated in this Period 
0 8.1% 23.1% 90.3% 
 Number of States Brought into 
  Complete Activation through 
  These Mass Activations 
0 2 5 26 
75%     
 Number of Counties in Mass  
  Activation 
0 3 159 1,051 
 Counties in Mass Activations as 
  a Percentage of All Counties 
  Activated in this Period 
0 0.5% 17.7% 71.4% 
 Number of States Brought into 
  Complete Activation through 
  These Mass Activations 
0 1 4 22 
Total Number of Counties  
 Activated Nationwide during 
 This Period 
83 569 900 1,471 
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II.  THE POLICY AND POLITICS OF TARGETED ENFORCEMENT 
The pattern of Secure Communities’ activation provides 
unique insight into the way a large, nationwide law enforcement 
agency wields discretion in order to satisfy its programmatic and 
political objectives. Constrained by limited resources, where did 
ICE initially concentrate its enforcement efforts? As a result of 
those decisions, what types of immigrants were most likely to be 
targeted by the program? 
To develop hypotheses about Secure Communities’ rollout 
strategy, it makes sense to begin with the public justifications 
for the program. As one might suspect from the name “Secure 
Communities,” agency officials have argued publicly that the 
program is designed to target enforcement resources at “crimi-
nal aliens” and to reduce crime.35 When the program was un-
veiled in March 2008, it was described as “a multi-year initiative 
to more effectively identify, detain and return removable crimi-
nal aliens.”36 This goal has been repeated time and again in 
press releases, in quarterly reports, and by agency officials from 
the head of Secure Communities up to Janet Napolitano, the 
Secretary of DHS. 
Prioritizing the removal of criminal offenders can be under-
stood in two different ways. First, it may simply reflect the reali-
ty of resource constraints. As John Morton, the Director of ICE, 
has noted repeatedly, the government lacks the resources to re-
move every noncitizen who is in violation of immigration law.37 
The government must therefore decide which noncitizens in this 
large pool should be targets for deportation. Perhaps unsurpris-
ingly, noncitizens who have committed serious crimes regularly 
top the list. 
Second, Secure Communities’ focus on criminal offenders 
may reflect the administration’s determination that not all 
 
 35 Secure Communities Oversight Hearing, 112th Cong, 1st Sess at 11–12 (cited in 
note 24) (statement of Gary Mead); DHS, Press Release, Secretary Napolitano’s Remarks 
on Smart Effective Border Security and Immigration Enforcement (Oct 5, 2011), online at 
http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/speeches/20111005-napolitano-remarks-border-strategy-and 
-immigration-enforcement.shtm (visited Mar 4, 2013). 
 36 ICE, News Release, ICE Unveils Sweeping New Plan to Target Criminal Aliens 
in Jails Nationwide (DHS Mar 28, 2008), online at http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ 
0804/080414washington.htm (visited Mar 4, 2013). 
 37 See, for example, John Morton, Director, ICE, Memorandum for all Field Office Di-
rectors, Special Agents in Charge, Chief Counsel, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Con-
sistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, 
Detention, and Removal of Aliens 2 (June 17, 2011), online at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/ 
secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf (visited Mar 4, 2013). 
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noncitizens who are in violation of immigration law should be 
deported. Recently the government has made explicit what has 
long been clear: that there is a distinction between those immi-
grants who are formally deportable and those whom the gov-
ernment actually wants to expend resources trying to deport.38 
Huge numbers of noncitizens are technically deportable, in part 
because the grounds of deportability have expanded dramatical-
ly over the years. But not all technically deportable noncitizens 
are considered undesirable by the government.39 In fact, Director 
Morton recently formalized this fact. Last June, he promulgated 
a memorandum on prosecutorial discretion directing line agents 
to decline to initiate removal proceedings against some nonciti-
zens who are technically deportable and describing in detail the 
factors that should be weighed in making the charging deci-
sion.40 Around the same time, ICE also initiated a review of over 
300 thousand pending deportation proceedings to decide which 
should be terminated.41 And most recently, President Barack 
Obama announced that the administration would not seek to 
deport hundreds of thousands of unauthorized migrants who came 
to the United States as children and have led successful lives.42 
If Secure Communities is designed to target serious criminals 
in order to make communities more secure, as the government 
argues, then one would expect the rollout to reflect that fact. 
 
 38 See Julia Preston and John H. Cushman Jr, Obama to Permit Young Migrants to 
Remain in U.S., NY Times A1 (June 16, 2012). For one explanation of why the govern-
ment might affirmatively prefer for some resident noncitizens to lack legal status, see 
Cox and Posner, 59 Stan L Rev at 851 (cited in note 4) (explaining that granting nonciti-
zens legal status would decrease flexibility for the government in terms of immigration 
screening processes). 
 39 In some ways this parallels the argument frequently made about American crim-
inal law—that a large gap exists between legal and moral culpability. See, for example, 
William J. Stuntz, The Collapse of American Criminal Justice 1–8 (Belknap 2011); Josh 
Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 
110 Colum L Rev 1655, 1658–61 (2010).  
 40 Morton, Memorandum, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion at 2–5 (cited in note 37). 
 41 See Christopher Goffard, Paloma Esquivel, and Teresa Watanabe, U.S. Will Re-
view Cases of Illegal Migrants: Low-Risk Individuals, Including Students, the Elderly, 
and Crime Victims, Might Be Able to Avoid Deportation, LA Times A1 (Aug 19, 2011).  
 42 See Preston and Cushman, Obama to Permit Young Migrants, NY Times at A1 
(cited in note 38); Janet Napolitano, Secretary of Homeland Security, Memorandum for 
David V. Aguilar, Acting Commissioner, US Customs and Border Protection, Alejandro 
Mayorkas, Director, US Citizenship and Immigration Services, John Morton, Director, 
ICE, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the 
United States as Children 1 (June 15, 2012), online at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/ 
assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf 
(visited Mar 4, 2013). 
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Without the ability to activate everywhere simultaneously, the 
government was forced to choose which communities to activate 
first. One prediction is that the government would bring the 
program online first in counties with the biggest crime prob-
lems—that is, places with the highest crime rates, or perhaps 
the highest rates of violent crime. Indeed, the executive director 
of Secure Communities has stated that the rollout would “ini-
tially focus[] on jurisdictions that have the highest estimated 
volumes of criminal aliens or criminal activity while remaining 
flexible.”43 Of course, as the statement notes, the focus might not 
be only on counties that have high crime rates if the goal is to 
reduce crime using a program that incapacitates and deters only 
noncitizens. Instead, the agency might target communities that 
have both a high crime rate and a large number of noncitizens. 
Or the agency might employ more elaborate strategies to predict 
which communities have the highest numbers of noncitizens en-
gaged in criminal activity. The strategic planning documents 
undergirding Secure Communities purport to do just this: they 
speak about the development of a “risk-based” rollout strategy 
that prioritizes activation in part based on a model designed to 
predict the number of noncitizens who will be arrested by local 
law enforcement.44 While details about this model have not been 
 
 43 Venturella, The Police Chief at 44 (cited in note 20) (emphasis added). This 
statement suggests a focus on crime rates—though it also suggests that rollout was suf-
ficiently “flexible” to incorporate non-crime-related factors. It also highlights that, in ad-
dition to focusing on areas with high levels of “criminal activity,” the agency might target 
areas with the highest rates of crime by noncitizens, or with large numbers of “criminal 
aliens.” Id. While in practice the rate of immigrant offending is unknown, the govern-
ment might pursue this strategy by targeting areas with both (a) high crime rates and 
(b) a high fraction of noncitizen population. We discuss this possibility below. In future 
work, we will show that the serial nature of the Secure Communities rollout makes it 
possible to draw inferences about the rate of immigrant offending. 
 44 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations for 2010, Hearing on Priorities 
Enforcing Immigration Law before the Subcommittee on Homeland Security of the House 
Committee on Appropriations, 111th Cong, 1st Sess 915, 943, 953 (2009) (statement of 
David Venturella, Executive Director of Secure Communities, ICE) (“Priorities Enforcing 
Immigration Law Hearing”) (indicating that increased deployment of biometric identifi-
cation technology would result in more data, which would allow ICE to target priority 
areas with more precision, enabling them to “predict and forecast the locations where we 
may encounter the greatest numbers of current and future criminal alien populations”); 
ICE, Secure Communities: Strategic Plan at 2–3 (cited in note 24) (indicating that the 
agency was “initiating risk-based deployment to cover increasing percentages of the es-
timated criminal alien population”); ICE, 1st Quarterly Status Report (April–June 2008) 
at 7–8 (cited in note 22). 
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made publicly available, crime-rate data appear to be a central 
component.45 
Despite its moniker, of course, crime reduction and public 
safety is not the only plausible goal Secure Communities might 
be designed to pursue. While this has been the agency’s stand-
ard justification for the program, many critics of Secure Com-
munities have argued that the government is instead using Se-
cure Communities to target “illegal immigration,” or simply to 
make deportations cheaper.46 Reducing the cost of immigration 
enforcement is clearly one advantage of tacking mandatory im-
migration screening onto every local arrest. If efficiency were 
the goal, one would predict that the government would initially 
direct the program’s limited resources to areas with large num-
bers of noncitizens who are in violation of immigration law, re-
gardless of whether they had engaged in criminal activity. Re-
latedly, the government might target areas with large numbers of 
unauthorized migrants, or some other subset of all immigration 
 
 45 See ICE, Criminal Alien Population Projection Analysis (CAPPA) Projected Ar-
rests and Releases—County Level (DHS Nov 2010), online at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/ 
foia/reports/cappa-projected-arrests-releases-county-level.xls (visited Mar 4, 2013). Ac-
cording to agency documents, the CAPPA analysis included: FBI violent crime statistics 
for 2007; 2000 US Census percentages of foreign-born, noncitizen populations; apprehen-
sions and charging documents issued by ICE’s own Detention and Removal Operations 
(DRO); and “CAP Limited Coverage, High-Risk Assessment for Tier 2 facilities,” pre-
sumably some internal analysis drawn from Tier 2 (second highest-risk) federal, state, 
and local prisons and jails. ICE, Secure Communities: Quarterly Report; First Quarter FY 
2009 at 30 (cited in note 17). Later congressional reports note refinements to the model. 
See, for example, ICE, Secure Communities: Quarterly Report; Fiscal Year 2009 Report to 
Congress—Third Quarter 26 (DHS Aug 27, 2009), online at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/ 
foia/secure_communities/congressionalstatusreportfy093rdquarter.pdf (visited Mar 4, 
2013); ICE, Secure Communities: Quarterly Report; Fiscal Year 2009 Report to Con-
gress—Second Quarter 26 (DHS June 1, 2009), online at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/ 
secure_communities/congressionalstatusreportfy092ndquarter.pdf (visited Mar 4, 2013). 
 46 See, for example, Pat Quinn, Governor of Illinois, Letter to Marc Rapp, Acting 
Assistant Director of Secure Communities, Secure Communities Program 1 (May 4, 
2011), online at http://epic.org/privacy/secure_communities/sc_ill.pdf (visited Mar 4, 
2013) (pointing out that while the agency had implied that only those aliens convicted for 
serious offenses would be targeted by Secure Communities, “more than 30% of those de-
ported from the United States, under the program, have never been convicted of any 
crime, much less a serious one”); Julia Preston, States Resisting Program Central to 
Obama’s Immigration Strategy, NY Times A18 (May 6, 2011); ACLU Statement on Se-
cure Communities, ACLU Blog of Rights (ACLU Nov 10, 2010), online at http://www.aclu 
.org/immigrants-rights/aclu-statement-secure-communities (visited Mar 4, 2013); Dan 
Frosch, In Colorado, Debate over Program to Check Immigration History of the Arrested, 
NY Times A16 (July 30, 2010) (quoting Cheryl Little, Executive Director for the Florida 
Immigrant Advocacy Center in Miami: “ICE claims, as it has done for years, that it is 
targeting dangerous criminals. Yet the program screens the fingerprints of anyone ar-
rested by local police, not just those convicted of crimes”). 
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violators. In fact, ICE itself has repeatedly identified one set of 
immigration violators as a target of Secure Communities: 
“[R]epeat violators who game the immigration system, those 
who fail to appear at immigration hearings, and fugitives who 
have already been ordered removed by an immigration judge.”47 
It would be difficult, if not impossible, for the government to 
target directly communities with large numbers of immigrant 
violators or unauthorized immigrants. There are no reliable lo-
cal measures of immigrant violators generally, or even of unau-
thorized population specifically. The national estimates of unau-
thorized population produced by the Pew Center and other  
organizations are subject to considerable uncertainty, and that 
uncertainty multiplies if one attempts to decompose the num-
bers into smaller units of geography.48 For this reason, states are 
the smallest units for which the Pew Center produces estimates 
of unauthorized population. 
Nonetheless, were the government interested in targeting 
the unauthorized it could rely on other variables that are corre-
lated with the unauthorized population. Proximity to the south-
ern border is one potential correlate, given that a large fraction 
of unauthorized migrants enter across the southern border and 
live in border regions.49 A second is a community’s noncitizen or 
 
 47 ICE, Secure Communities: The Basics (DHS Aug 31, 2012), online at http:// 
www.ice.gov/secure_communities/#top (visited Mar 4, 2013). See also ICE, Secure 
Communities: Quarterly Report; Fiscal Year 2011 Report to Congress—First Quarter 
7 (DHS Mar 1, 2011), online at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/  
congressionalstatusreportfy111stquarter.pdf (visited Mar 4, 2013); ICE, Secure Com-
munities: Quarterly Report; Fiscal Year 2010 Report to Congress—First Quarter 6 (DHS 
Mar 1, 2010), online at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/ 
congressionalstatusreportfy101stquarter.pdf (visited Mar 4, 2013); ICE, Secure Commu-
nities: Quarterly Report; Second Quarter FY 2009 at 30 (cited in note 45); ICE, Secure 
Communities: Quarterly Report; First Quarter FY 2009 at 26 (cited at note 17). 
 48 Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Population: Na-
tional and State Trends, 2010 3 (Pew Hispanic Center Feb 1, 2011), online at http://www 
.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/133.pdf (visited Mar 4, 2013). See also Michael Hoefer, 
Nancy Rytina, and Bryan Baker, Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population 
Residing in the United States: January 2011 1 (DHS Mar 2012), online at http://www.dhs 
.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_ill_pe_2011.pdf (visited Mar 4, 2013). 
 49 See Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, A Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants 
in the United States 21 (Pew Hispanic Center Apr 14, 2009), online at http://www 
.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/107.pdf (visited Mar 4, 2013). Secretary Napolitano official-
ly made border areas a priority for activation in March 2009, when she announced the 
Southwest Border Security Initiative. But her stated reason for this prioritization was to 
“crack down on Mexican drug cartels . . . to prevent the violence in Mexico from spilling 
over across the border.” DHS, Press Release, Secretary Napolitano Announces Major 
Southwest Border Security Initiative (Mar 24, 2009), online at http://www.dhs.gov/ 
ynews/releases/pr_1237909530921.shtm (visited Mar 4, 2013); Priorities Enforcing 
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foreign-born population—though the latter measure includes 
naturalized citizens and both proxies includes lawful migrants 
as well as those who are in violation of immigration law. A third 
potential proxy is the size of a community’s Hispanic population. 
Nearly half of all immigrants living in the United States today 
are of Hispanic origin, and more than three-quarters of all unau-
thorized immigrants are from Central or South America.50 
Of course, all of these proxies are both over- and underin-
clusive. For example, while most unauthorized migrants are 
Hispanic, the vast majority of Hispanic residents in the United 
States are not unauthorized. Nonetheless, there is some evi-
dence that the government is using imperfect proxies to evaluate 
progress under the rollout. In DHS’s 2011 appropriations report 
for Congress, for example, the agency emphasized as a key Se-
cure Communities accomplishment from 2009 the deployment of 
biometric technology to “approximately 31 percent of the esti-
mated nationwide number of the foreign born non citizen popu-
lation.”51 The goals for 2010 included “covering approximately 96 
percent of the estimated nationwide number of the foreign born 
non citizen population.”52 Notably, the agency’s own chosen met-
ric here is not the population of immigration violators, nor is it 
the population of noncitizens engaged in criminal activity or 
 
Immigration Law Hearing, 111th Cong, 1st Sess at 931–32 (cited in note 44) (statement 
of Mary M. Forman, Director of Office of Investigations, ICE); DHS, Press Release, Sec-
retary Napolitano Announces Secure Communities Deployment to All Southwest Border 
Counties, Facilitating Identification and Removal of Convicted Criminal Aliens (Aug 10, 
2010), online at http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1281457837494.shtm (visited Mar 
4, 2013); ICE, Secure Communities: Quarterly Report; Second Quarter FY 2009 at 8–9 
(cited in note 45). See also Secure Communities Oversight Hearing, 112th Cong, 1st Sess 
at 13 (cited in note 24) (statement of Gary Mead) (“Since 2008, ICE has expanded . . . 
Secure Communities from 14 jurisdictions to more than 1,729 today, including every ju-
risdiction along the Southwest border.”) (emphasis added). 
 50 See Eileen Patten, Statistical Portrait of the Foreign-Born Population in the 
United States, 2010, table 6 (Pew Hispanic Center Feb 21, 2012), online at 
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/02/21/statistical-portrait-of-the-foreign-born-population 
-in-the-united-states-2010/#6 (visited Mar 4, 2013) (showing that 18,817,105 of 39,916,875 
immigrants reported their ethnicity as Hispanic); Passel and Cohn, Portrait of Unau-
thorized Immigrants at 21 (cited in note 49) (noting that 59 percent of unauthorized mi-
grants are from Mexico, 11 percent are from other Central American countries, and 7 
percent are from South America). 
 51 ICE, Salaries and Expenses: Fiscal Year 2011; Overview—Congressional Justi-
fication 67–68 (DHS), online at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/ 
fy2011overviewcongressionaljustification.pdf (visited Mar 4, 2013). 
 52 Id at 68–69. 
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convicted of crimes. Instead, the agency touts coverage of areas 
with large numbers of noncitizens.53 
We should note, of course, that the twin objectives of immi-
gration and crime control are not mutually exclusive. One could 
imagine the program pursuing both goals to a certain extent—
perhaps a realistic assumption in a world where agency officials 
regularly single out both violent criminal offenders and repeat 
immigration offenders as the highest priority enforcement tar-
gets. Moreover, as we noted above, even if the government’s ul-
timate focus were purely crime control, such a focus might not 
lead the government to rely exclusively on crime rates to deter-
mine rollout strategy. Nonetheless, these slightly different hy-
potheses about the government’s means and ends all point to the 
same broad conclusions about what we should expect of the 
rollout strategy: the crime reduction strategy leads to targeting 
communities with high crime rates, and the immigration en-
forcement strategy leads to targeting communities with high 
levels of some proxy for immigration violators. 
In addition to potential programmatic objectives, such as 
targeting serious criminals or reducing the cost of immigration 
enforcement, political objectives or pressures may also have 
shaped the use of discretion in Secure Communities’ rollout. 
Some communities have applauded the idea of checking immi-
gration status as part of the criminal process.54 A number of 
states have even required such checks in the absence of any fed-
eral agreement or program.55 In contrast, other communities 
have objected to Secure Communities. They have argued that 
the program undermines community policing by making local 
citizens wary of the police and imposes significant detention 
costs on local governments asked to hold prisoners in local jails 
until ICE agents take custody.56 These complaints have garnered 
national media attention, with prominent governors such as 
Deval Patrick and Pat Quinn arguing that Secure Communities 
should not be implemented in their states.57 
 
 53 Id at 67–68. 
 54 See generally ICE, What Others Are Saying . . . about Secure Communities (DHS 
June 2011), online at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/what-others-say.pdf 
(visited Mar 4, 2013) (collecting sources supportive of Secure Communities from across 
the country). 
 55 See, for example, SB 1070 § 2, codified at Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 11-1051(B) (2010). 
 56 See, for example, Quinn, Letter, Secure Communities Program at 1 (cited in note 46). 
 57 See Deval L. Patrick, Hillel Moral Voices Lecture (Apr 30, 2012), online at http:// 
www.mass.gov/governor/pressoffice/speeches/20120430-tufts-moral-voices-immigration.html 
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If agency officials are sensitive to the possibility of political 
support or backlash against their program, as the literature on 
cooperative federalism suggests will often be the case,58 then we 
would predict that the program would be activated first in com-
munities that supported increased immigration enforcement, 
with activation delayed for communities that opposed the en-
forcement measure. Here too, the hypothesis finds support in 
the agency’s public statements: agency documents state that 
early activation may be prioritized for those communities that 
have expressed an interest in partnering with ICE.59 
As a starting point, therefore, we approach the activation 
data with three quite different hypotheses about the role discre-
tion may have played in the program’s implementation. Two of 
the hypotheses focus on the possibility that officials pursued im-
plementation in places where the social need was considered 
greatest from a policy perspective—though the policy need can 
be understood in at least two different ways, depending on 
whether the focus is on serious criminals or not. The other hy-
pothesis focuses on the possibility that officials pursued imple-
mentation in places where the political benefits were biggest 
and the risk of backlash, smallest. 
III.  TESTING THE HYPOTHESES 
To test these hypotheses, as well as other questions that we 
will explore in future work, we collected a large set of data relat-
ed to both immigration and criminal enforcement. For purposes 
of this Article we assembled the data into a cross section of US 
counties. For each county, the data include four large sets of 
information: 
(1) Secure Communities operational data. Through a FOIA 
request, we secured comprehensive statistics for Secure 
Communities that ICE collected as part of its implementa-
tion of the program. When combined with publicly available 
data, these statistics cover the period from October 2008 
 
(visited Mar 4, 2013); Elise Foley, Massachusetts Rejects Secure Communities Immigration 
Enforcement Program, Huffington Post (June 6, 2011), online at http://www.huffingtonpost 
.com/2011/06/06/massachusetts-rejects-immgration-enforcement-program_n_871970.html 
(visited Mar 4, 2013); Quinn, Letter, Secure Communities Program at 1 (cited in note 46). 
 58 See, for example, Roderick M. Hills Jr, The Political Economy of Cooperative 
Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 Mich 
L Rev 813, 816 (1998). 
 59 ICE, 1st Quarterly Status Report (April–June 2008) at 7–8 (cited in note 22). 
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through July 2012. For this Article, the most relevant data 
provide the date on which Secure Communities was activat-
ed in each county around the country. But the data are far 
richer than this. They also include a tremendous amount of 
operational data concerning the program. On a county-by-
month basis, the data include a wealth of information about 
the investigative, charging, and dispositional stages of en-
forcement, including: number of submissions; number of 
hits in the IDENT immigration database;60 number of per-
sons against whom ICE initiated removal proceedings; and 
number of removals. Moreover, this county-by-month data 
is further broken down by offense category, making it possi-
ble to separate serious offenders, minor offenders, and per-
sons with no criminal convictions. 
 
(2) Demographic data. From the USA Counties file,61 we as-
sembled a variety of county-level demographic data. These 
data include each county’s racial composition, foreign-born 
population, crime rate, level of wealth and poverty, popula-
tion density, police force size, and level of support for the 
Republican presidential candidate in 2004. 
 
(3) Immigration lawmaking and enforcement data. Using 
publicly available data, we collected information on coopera-
tive enforcement agreements entered into by local govern-
ments pursuant to § 287(g) of the INA. Using data gener-
ously provided by Huyen Pham and Pham Hoang Van, we 
assembled information on recent state and local legislation 
relating to immigration enforcement.62 
 
 60 The IDENT database includes persons who have lawfully immigrated to the 
United States in recent years, as well as persons who have had an enforcement encoun-
ter with ICE. Thus, even over the time period it covers, the IDENT database is both 
over- and underinclusive as a source of information about immigration violators. Many 
lawful immigrants and citizens are in the database, and unauthorized migrants who 
have never been deported are unlikely to be in it. See note 21.  
 61 See USA Counties (Census Bureau), online at http://censtats.census.gov/usa/usa 
.shtml (visited Mar 4, 2013). 
 62 This data was collected by Pham and Pham as part of their project studying the 
adoption of local immigration laws and the local political climate for migrants. For parts 
of their research, see generally Huyen Pham and Pham Hoang Van, The Economic Im-
pact of Local Immigration Regulation: An Empirical Analysis, 32 Cardozo L Rev 485 
(2010); Huyen Pham and Pham Hoang Van, Measuring the Climate for Immigrants: A 
State-by-State Analysis, in Gabriel Jack Chin and Carissa Hessick, eds, Illegals in the 
Backyard: State and Local Regulation of Immigration Policy (NYU forthcoming 2013). 
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(4) Criminal enforcement data. From the Uniform Crime 
Reports, we assembled data on both offending and arrest 
rates. These data are reported each month by every law en-
forcement agency in the country. Both the offense and ar-
rest data are broken down by offense type and provide in-
formation on the race of persons arrested (though the 
demographic information does not include coding on His-
panic origin). We aggregated individual law enforcement 
agency data up to the county level for the year 2007, the 
year before Secure Communities was implemented.63 
A. The Basic Patterns 
To test our hypotheses about Secure Communities, we begin 
with some summary statistics about the differences between 
early and later activating counties. The government has said re-
peatedly that it targeted high-priority areas for early activation. 
As a result, the counties in which Secure Communities was first 
activated provide revealing information about the government’s 
highest priorities for the program. Moreover, as we explained 
earlier, ICE activated only a very small number of scattered 
counties in the first twelve months of the program—slightly 
more than 3 percent of all counties. The slow rollout of the pro-
gram highlights the deliberateness of the choices made in 
launching the program and permits us to use county-level data 
about crime and demographics to see whether the rollout pat-
terns are consistent with the various goals the government 
might have pursued. 
In these summary statistics we focus on our first two hy-
potheses: targeting crime and criminal violators on the one 
hand, and targeting immigration violators on the other. (We add 
our third hypothesis—targeting pockets of local political sup-
port—in the later sections.) Our prediction above was that the 
first goal would lead the government to target high-crime 
communities for early activation, while the second goal would 
lead the government to target proxies for immigration violators, 
 
 63 The FBI releases the Master Arrest and Offense files on a lagged basis, so 2011 
data did not become available until early 2013. See FBI, Uniform Crime Reports: UCR 
Publication Schedule (Tentative), online at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/publication 
-schedule (visited Mar 4, 2013); FBI, Preliminary Semiannual Uniform Crime Report, 
January–June 2012, online at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/ 
preliminary-semiannual-uniform-crime-report-january-june-2012 (visited Mar 4, 2013). 
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such as border proximity, noncitizen population, or perhaps 
Hispanic population. 
TABLE 2.  COMPARING THE CHARACTERISTICS OF 
EARLY AND LATER ACTIVATING COUNTIES 
 
 
Characteristic 
Counties Activated within 
First 12 Months of Program 
(1) 
Counties  
Activated Later 
(2) 
 
Difference of  
(1) − (2) 
County Is on Southern 
 Border with Mexico 
0.265 
(0.078) 
0.0023 
(0.0014) 
0.263** 
(0.078) 
County Is on the Gulf  
 of Mexico 
0.133 
(0.044) 
0.015 
(0.080) 
0.118** 
(0.038) 
Fraction of Population 
 Noncitizen 
0.095 
(0.007) 
0.025 
(0.003) 
0.070** 
(0.007) 
Fraction of Population 
 Hispanic 
0.379 
(0.091) 
0.068 
(0.016) 
0.312** 
(0.080) 
Log Violent Crime Rate 
5.832 
(0.114) 
4.717 
(0.207) 
1.115** 
(0.240) 
Log Property Crime Rate 
7.930 
(0.072) 
6.917 
(0.255) 
1.013** 
(0.265) 
N 83 2,994 3,077 
 
**p < 0.05 
 
Note: The table reports means, with standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Table 2 tests these simple predictions by comparing crime 
rates, fractions of the noncitizen and Hispanic population, and 
border proximity by date of activation. The first row shows that 
counties activated within the first twelve months of Secure 
Communities were concentrated along the southern border. 
Counties along the southern border with Mexico represent only 
1 percent of all US counties, but they accounted for nearly 27 
percent of the counties activated during the first year of Secure 
Communities. After the first year, these border counties ac-
counted for only about one-quarter of one percentage point of 
counties activated. The concentration of activations is unmis-
takable and highlights the fact that the overwhelming majority of 
counties along the southern border with Mexico were activated 
during Secure Communities’ first year. Counties adjacent to the 
Gulf of Mexico were also more likely to activate during the first 
year of the program. 
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The third and fourth rows show that locations activated in 
the first year also had higher proportions of noncitizens and 
Hispanics in their populations. The magnitudes of these differ-
ences were substantial. Noncitizens accounted for 9.5 percent of 
persons in counties activated during the first year of Secure 
Communities, compared to only 2.5 percent in counties activated 
later. In other words, the proportion of the noncitizens in com-
munities activated earliest was more than three times that of 
communities activated later. 
The differences with respect to the proportion of Hispanics 
in the population were still larger. Hispanics constituted 37.9 
percent of the population in early-activating counties and only 
6.8 percent in counties activating later. That is, the fraction of 
Hispanics in counties activated during the first year of Secure 
Communities was more than five times that of counties activat-
ed later. A remarkable feature of this difference is that it cannot 
be fully explained by the concentration of early activations in 
border counties. Border counties comprise about 27 percent of 
early activations, and a higher fraction of their population is 
Hispanic than the average among other counties. Yet, even if 
border counties were populated entirely by Hispanics, the aver-
age fraction of Hispanic population in early-activating counties 
would not exceed 27 percent. Instead, the nearly 38 percent 
share of Hispanics in early-activating counties can only be ex-
plained by the fact that the government targeted counties that 
were not on the southern border but that did have proportion-
ately large Hispanic populations. These demographic differences 
suggest that Secure Communities may have been directed in 
part at counties where more immigration violators were ex-
pected to be found. 
The final two rows of Table 2 contemplate the other possible 
policy objective of Secure Communities: crime control. They 
compare the rates of violent and property crimes in early- and 
later-activating counties. Consistent with conventional practice 
in the academic literature, the crime rates are expressed as nat-
ural logarithms of the crime rate scaled up by 100 thousand. 
Crime rates vary widely across jurisdictions, and this convention 
places less weight on outlying locations with extremely high or 
low crime rates.64 Early-activating counties had higher rates of 
 
 64 For an explanation of the use of natural logarithms of the crime rate rather than 
the crime rate itself, see Lance Hannon, Peter Knapp, and Robert DeFina, Racial Similarity 
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both violent and property crime, and the differences are statisti-
cally meaningful. The difference suggests that Secure Communi-
ties may have been directed in part at counties with more severe 
crime problems. 
As mentioned above, the hypotheses about the goals of Se-
cure Communities are not mutually exclusive, and Table 2 pro-
vides some support for both hypotheses about enforcement prior-
ities. But the table also shows that the speed of activation 
correlates more strongly with certain county characteristics 
than with others, suggesting that one objective of the program 
had higher priority. The differences in crime rates were more 
modest than those in the measures of immigration enforcement. 
For example, the difference of just over one log point for the vio-
lent crime rate appears small. When expressed in levels, the vio-
lent crime rate in the first counties to activate is double that of 
later-activating counties. Still, this difference is much smaller 
than the 300 percent difference in the proportion who are noncit-
izens or the 500 percent difference in the proportion who are 
Hispanic. The upshot is that the different county characteristics 
of early activators suggest that both general immigration en-
forcement and crime control priorities shaped Secure Communi-
ties’ rollout. But the selection of counties appears more con-
sistent with the desire to target immigration violators 
generally—rather than just those engaged in serious criminal 
activity—because early activations targeted counties close to the 
border and counties with a high proportion of noncitizen and 
Hispanic persons in the population. 
B. Hazard Analysis 
Summary statistics offer some clues about the enforcement 
priorities of Secure Communities, but they do not control for 
numerous other factors that are potentially relevant. To better 
assess whether the patterns in Table 2 are robust to other influ-
ences, we proceed to multivariate analysis. 
In this Section, we present estimates from survival or haz-
ard models, which are particularly well-suited to the analysis 
of the rollout of Secure Communities. Hazard models have two 
important advantages for present purposes. First, they allow 
us to focus directly on how much time passes before a county is 
 
in the Relationship between Poverty and Homicide Rates: Comparing Retransformed Co-
efficients, 34 Soc Sci Rsrch 893, 898–901 (2005). 
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activated under Secure Communities. Waiting time provides the 
best information about the government’s prioritization because 
the length of time until activation measures the temporal se-
quencing of the program’s rollout. Alternative approaches, such 
as binary measures of whether the program has been activated 
in a county, are not appropriate because the program will even-
tually operate nationwide. We measure waiting times as com-
mencing in October 2008, the first month of Secure Communi-
ties’ rollout, and ending when the individual county activates. 
The second advantage of hazard analysis is that it produces 
robust results even when the event of interest—here, activa-
tion—has not yet occurred for some members of the sample. At 
the time of our study, 3 percent of counties in the United States 
had not yet activated the program. Even though these counties 
are (right) censored—in that the event of interest has not yet oc-
curred for them—hazard analysis permits the outcomes for 
these counties to be related to a set of explanatory variables.65 
In the analysis that follows, the hazard function for a county 
is the risk of the event (activation) occurring at time t, condi-
tional on having survived (not activated) until that time.66 The 
specific hazard models presented here are Cox proportional haz-
ard models, which are widely used because they avoid bias by 
not making an arbitrary assumption about the baseline haz-
ard.67 The relationship of an explanatory variable to the hazard 
(or risk) of the event is more easily interpreted with hazard rati-
os—that is, the ratio of a risk of a particular event relative to 
the baseline risk—and for that reason, Table 3 reports hazard 
ratios. Hazard ratios of greater than 1.00 imply that the varia-
ble is associated with an increased hazard or shorter waiting 
time, and a hazard ratio of less than 1.00 suggests the variable 
is associated with a lower hazard or longer waiting time. 
To test our three hypotheses, the hazard models in Table 3 
include explanatory variables tracking county demography, 
proximity to the border, crime, and potential political support 
 
 65 See S.W. Lagakos, General Right Censoring and Its Impact on the Analysis of 
Survival, 35 Persp in Biometry 139, 139 (1979). 
 66 Slightly more formally, the hazard is specified as hi(t, Xi) = ho(t)exp(Xi), where Xi 
are county i’s observed characteristics and  is a vector of coefficients. The term exp(Xi) 
shifts the baseline hazard function, with a positive coefficient indicating that the explan-
atory variable increases the hazard. 
 67 See generally D.R. Cox, Regression Models and Life Tables, 34 J Royal Stat Socy 
Series B (Methodological) 187 (1972). 
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for Secure Communities.68 The models also include fixed effects 
for each state, though these are not reported in the tables in or-
der to conserve space.69 
 
 68 As described above, we follow the convention of expressing crime rates in natural 
logarithms. For counties with zero values for crime rates, we also followed the conven-
tion of replacing the missing values for these log crime rates with zeroes and including 
an indicator variable taking a value of 1.00 when such substitutions were made. We do 
not report in the tables below the estimates for these indicator variables. 
 69 The inclusion of fixed effects for states ensures that our results are driven by 
county-level characteristics rather than state-level characteristics. The inclusion of fixed 
effects is particularly important in light of a fact we documented earlier—that later acti-
vations were more likely to be lumpy, state-wide affairs. 
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TABLE 3.  ESTIMATING THE TIME UNTIL ACTIVATION 
County Characteristic (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
County Is on Southern 
 Border with Mexico 
4.187** 
(1.006) — 
4.859** 
(1.480) 
4.191** 
(1.037) 
4.190** 
(1.021) 
4.103** 
(0.908) 
County Is on the Gulf of 
 Mexico 
1.581 
(0.575) — 
1.619 
(0.623) 
1.584 
(0.586) 
1.582 
(0.574) 
1.587 
(0.581) 
Fraction of Population 
 Hispanic 
2.166** 
(0.565) 
3.282** 
(1.124) — 
2.132** 
(0.556) 
2.152** 
(0.556) 
2.205** 
(0.582) 
Fraction of Population 
 Noncitizen 
0.937 
(1.205) 
0.607 
(0.797) 
3.848 
(4.066) — — 
1.257 
(1.497) 
Fraction of Population 
 Foreign-Born — — — — 
0.970 
(1.130) — 
Change in Fraction of 
 Population Hispanic 
 2000–2010 
— — — — — 0.432 (0.758) 
Fraction of Population 
 Black 
0.570 
(0.268) 
0.508 
(0.250) 
0.529 
(0.256) 
0.570 
(0.268) 
0.570 
(0.268) 
0.584 
(0.277) 
Log Violent Crime Rate 
1.025 
(0.024) 
1.201 
(0.023) 
1.028 
(0.024) 
1.025 
(0.024) 
1.025 
(0.024) 
1.026 
(0.024) 
Log Property Crime Rate 
1.013 
(0.020) 
1.021 
(0.021) 
1.013 
(0.020) 
1.013 
(0.021) 
1.013 
(0.020) 
1.013 
(0.020) 
Log Population Density 
1.231** 
(0.043) 
1.246** 
(0.043) 
1.231** 
(0.043) 
1.231** 
(0.045) 
1.231** 
(0.041) 
1.231** 
(0.042) 
Log Income per Capita 
0.945 
(0.117) 
0.936 
(0.130) 
0.904 
(0.111) 
0.943 
(0.129) 
0.945 
(0.118) 
0.951 
(0.115) 
Fraction in Poverty 
0.474 
(0.348) 
0.603 
(0.381) 
0.521 
(0.348) 
0.472 
(0.359) 
0.473 
(0.350) 
0.458 
(0.354) 
Fraction of Vote in 2004 
 for Republican Presi-
 dent 
0.750 
(0.403) 
0.746 
(0.461) 
0.723 
(0.401) 
0.749 
(0.407) 
0.749 
(0.406) 
0.775 
(0.378) 
Count of Local Anti- 
 Immigrant Legislation 
0.997 
(0.082) 
0.987 
(0.084) 
0.997 
(0.082) 
0.997 
(0.082) 
0.997 
(0.082) 
0.999 
(0.084) 
Local 287(g) Agreement 
4.164** 
(1.493) 
4.441** 
(1.681) 
4.109** 
(1.458) 
4.159** 
(1.487) 
4.162** 
(1.498) 
4.151** 
(1.498) 
 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05 
 
Note: The table reports hazard ratios, with standard errors in parentheses. N = 3,077. 
Estimates for state fixed effects are not reported in order to conserve space. 
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1. Immigration enforcement. 
The first set of explanatory variables in Table 3 explores the 
striking pattern in the summary statistics—that county de-
mographics and border proximity, much more than crime rates, 
appear to be highly correlated with activation. These patterns 
hinted that the rollout might not have been targeted exclusively 
at crime reduction. As we will see below, the hazard models in 
Table 3 confirm some of these patterns but undermine others in 
surprising and potentially troubling ways. 
The strongest correlates of activation remain location on the 
southern border and the fraction of the population that is His-
panic. The hazard models show that a county’s location on the 
border with Mexico is strongly correlated with a high risk of ac-
tivation. The estimates imply that counties on the southern bor-
der have a hazard rate of activation roughly four times higher 
than that of other counties. 
The fraction of Hispanics in the county population also 
strongly predicts activation. For example, the estimate in col-
umn (1) implies that a 10 percentage-point increase in the share 
of Hispanics in a county’s population corresponds to an 8.0 per-
cent jump in the hazard for Secure Communities activation.70 
This result confirms that the pattern seen in the summary sta-
tistics of Table 2 for the Hispanic share of the population does 
not diminish when we control for other factors that might influ-
ence activation. Moreover, to alleviate the concern that this cor-
relation is an artifact of some unobserved characteristic that 
correlates with minority population more generally, we provide 
for a sort of placebo test by including in the model a measure of 
the black population. Because this measure of race lacks the sa-
lience in contemporary debates about immigration enforcement 
that Hispanic ethnicity carries, one would not expect it to corre-
late with activation. Consistent with this intuition, the estimate 
for black population is less than 1.00, implying that counties 
with proportionately more black residents were activated later 
on average rather than being prioritized for early activation. In 
addition, each estimate for a county’s black population is statis-
tically insignificant, indicating that it, unlike Hispanic ethnicity, 
does not have a statistically significant correlation with the tim-
ing of activation. 
 
 70 To see this, note that ln(2.166) = 0.7729, and exp(0.7729*0.1) = 1.0804. 
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The correlations for border proximity and Hispanic popula-
tion are also robust. In every specification in Table 3 that in-
cludes these variables, the estimates are statistically significant 
and relatively stable in magnitude. Of course, these variables 
correlate strongly with each other; counties along the border 
have proportionately much larger Hispanic populations than the 
national average. To gauge how sensitive the estimate for each 
of these variables is to the presence of the other, column (2) re-
ports an equation in which both indicators for the southern bor-
der were dropped, and column (3) reports an estimate in which 
the variable for Hispanic population was dropped. The exclu-
sions add to the magnitude of the remaining variable’s estimate 
but not enormously so: dropping the border variables raises the 
hazard ratio for the Hispanic share of the population from 2.166 
to 3.282, while dropping the Hispanic variable raises the hazard 
ratio for the southern border from 4.187 to 4.859. Moreover, if 
we reestimate the equation excluding border counties from the 
sample entirely, the estimates are relatively unchanged. The es-
timated hazard ratio for the Hispanic share in particular re-
mains statistically significant and largely unchanged at 2.135 
(standard error = 0.665). These estimates show that although 
these two county characteristics are correlated, each plausibly 
captures a different influence on the risk of activation. 
In the summary statistics above, a county’s noncitizen popu-
lation was also correlated with activation—though more weakly 
than Hispanic population or border proximity. In the hazard 
models, however, the relationship between noncitizen population 
and activation is flipped on its head. The hazard ratio for noncit-
izens is in some models less than 1.00. This means that, rather 
than increasing the likelihood of activation, a larger share of 
noncitizens in a county modestly reduces the likelihood of activa-
tion. For example, the hazard ratio of 0.937 in column (1) im-
plies that a 10 percentage-point increase in the share of nonciti-
zens in a county’s population lowers the hazard by about 1 
percentage point.71 
The direction of this estimate is surprising, even counterin-
tuitive. The central function of Secure Communities is to check 
the status of noncitizens through fingerprints, and on one theory 
this technology would promise the greatest benefit where there 
 
 71 To see this, note that ln(0.937) = −0.651, and exp(−0.651*0.1) = 0.994. This indi-
cates that a county with a share of noncitizens that is 10 percentage points greater than 
the baseline has a hazard that is 85 percent that of the baseline. 
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are the most noncitizens. Yet noncitizen population does not 
predict activation. Moreover, the results for noncitizens contrast 
sharply with the estimates for Hispanic population. If taken at 
face value, they indicate that early activation targeted counties 
with large Hispanic populations but did not target counties with 
large noncitizen populations. 
Of course, a crucial caveat to these estimates is that they re-
flect the effect of noncitizens’ population share after controlling 
for the Hispanic share and other county characteristics. As men-
tioned above, Hispanic ethnicity and noncitizen status are high-
ly correlated in these data, and thus any correlation between 
noncitizens and activation may be captured to a large extent by 
the presence of the Hispanic share variable. The results provide 
some reason to believe this is the case. When the Hispanic share 
variable is excluded from the set of explanatory variables in col-
umn (3), the estimate for noncitizens’ share changes direction, 
implying that a 10 percentage-point increase in the proportion of 
noncitizens in the county raises the risk of activation by 14 per-
cent.72 For this reason, it would be inappropriate to advance a 
strong claim that Hispanic ethnicity accelerated activation while 
noncitizen status slowed it. 
That said, it is important to note that Hispanics’ share of a 
county’s population appears to be a more powerful predictor of 
activation than noncitizens’ share of the population. Just as any 
correlation between noncitizens and activation may be captured 
to a large extent by the presence of the Hispanic share variable, 
the opposite could be said about the noncitizens variable. But 
while the presence of the Hispanic variable eliminates the corre-
lation between noncitizen population and activation (and in fact 
suggests an inverse correlation), the opposite is not true: the 
presence of the noncitizens variable does not impair the correla-
tion between ethnicity and the activation hazard. Column (4) 
shows that when the measure of noncitizens is excluded from 
the equation, the estimated hazard ratio for Hispanics’ share 
falls only modestly from 2.166 to 2.132. Thus, Hispanic popula-
tion does appear to exert a greater influence on the estimate for 
noncitizens than vice versa. 
Perhaps even more important, none of the estimates for 
noncitizens’ share attain statistical significance—not even in 
column (3) when the Hispanic variable is excluded from the 
 
 72 To see this, note that ln(3.848) = 1.348, and exp(1.348*0.1) = 1.144. 
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equation and the noncitizen estimate connotes a positive rela-
tionship with the activation hazard. In contrast, the estimates 
for Hispanics’ population share are positive and statistically 
significant in every single model. These patterns suggest that 
the time-until-activation correlates more closely with the pro-
portion of Hispanics in a county than with the proportion of 
noncitizens.73 
2. Crime control. 
The second set of variables tests our second hypothesis 
about the objectives of Secure Communities: its relationship to 
crime control. If crime control was a key objective of the pro-
gram, we would predict that locations with higher crime rates 
should have activated sooner.74 The summary statistics in Table 
2 provided some evidence for this hypothesis. But the hazard 
analysis undermines this support. Once we control for other in-
fluences on activation, local crime rates are not consistently cor-
related with the decision to activate Secure Communities. 
As in the summary statistics, Table 3 includes two principal 
measures of crime rate: the (log) rate of violent crime and the 
(log) rate of property crime. Given Secure Communities’ putative 
focus on violent crime, we would predict that the violent crime 
rate, but perhaps not the property crime rate, would be associat-
ed with early activation. In fact, however, neither measure of 
crime predicts early activation. The hazard ratios for both vio-
lent and property crime hover around the baseline risk of 1.00, 
and none of these estimates attains statistical significance. 
These estimates imply that, contrary to our prediction, 
crime rates are not closely related to the activation hazard—a 
surprising result. In order to explore the apparent irrelevance of 
crime rates in more depth, Table 4 presents a series of addition-
al models that examine more closely why crime rates have such 
a weak relationship to the speed of activation. 
 
 73 Replacing noncitizen population with foreign-born population produces the same 
results. The model in column (5) replaces the measure of noncitizens with the fraction of 
foreign-born persons in the population. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the foreign-born and 
noncitizen variables are highly correlated, and the estimates from using one measure are 
essentially identical to those from using the other. These results suggest that the activa-
tion hazard correlates with the fraction of Hispanics in a county rather than either the 
fraction noncitizen or the fraction foreign-born. 
 74 See text accompanying notes 35–45. 
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TABLE 4.  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CRIME 
AND TIME-UNTIL-ACTIVATION 
County Characteristic (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
County Is on Southern Border 
 with Mexico 
4.187** 
(1.006) 
4.214** 
(1.010) 
4.126** 
(0.939) 
3.813** 
(0.949) 
5.341** 
(1.663) 
County Is on the Gulf of  
 Mexico 
1.581 
(0.575) 
1.582 
(0.574) 
1.558 
(0.551) 
1.511 
(0.494) 
1.550 
(0.541) 
Fraction of Population  
 Hispanic 
2.166** 
(0.565) 
2.163** 
(0.569) 
2.084** 
(0.574) 
2.148** 
(0.538) 
2.194** 
(0.553) 
Fraction of Population 
 Noncitizen 
0.937 
(1.205) 
0.928 
(1.202) 
0.869 
(1.139) 
1.079 
(1.520) 
2.190 
(2.887) 
Log Violent Crime Rate 
1.025 
(0.024) 
1.033 
(0.025) — 
1.027 
(0.024) 
1.060** 
(0.028) 
Log Property Crime Rate 
1.013 
(0.020) — 
0.995 
(0.018) 
0.997 
(0.022) 
1.083** 
(0.025) 
Log Murder Rate — — 
0.979 
(0.034) — — 
Log Rape Rate — — 
1.025 
(0.026) — — 
Log Aggravated Assault Rate — — 
0.995 
(0.020) — — 
Log Robbery Rate 
 
— — 1.082 (0.032) — — 
Log Police Officers per Capita — — — 
1.013 
(0.100) — 
Log Population Density 
1.231** 
(0.043) 
1.232** 
(0.043) 
1.202** 
(0.045) 
1.257** 
(0.058) 
— 
 
Log Income per Capita 
0.945 
(0.117) 
0.950 
(0.118) 
0.886 
(0.111) 
0.925 
(0.121) 
1.266 
(0.189) 
Fraction in Poverty 
0.474 
(0.348) 
0.476 
(0.351) 
0.391 
(0.293) 
0.489 
(0.344) 
0.213** 
(0.173) 
 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05 
 
Note: The table reports hazard ratios, with standard errors in parentheses. N = 3,077, 
except for column (4) where N = 2,827. The baseline regression in column (1) is identical 
to the baseline regression in column (1) of Table 3. Estimates for some variables in the 
baseline model are not reported in order to conserve space. 
 
Table 4 explores three potential problems with Table 3’s es-
timates about the relevance of crime rates. The first stems from 
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the close correlation between violent crime and property crime. 
If violent crime is, as agency officials suggest, the program’s 
highest priority, then the inclusion of both violent and property 
crime in the model might, because of their close correlation, 
mask a strong relationship between activation and violent of-
fenses. The equation in column (2) excludes the property crime 
rate from the set of explanatory variables, and the resulting es-
timates reject this possibility. The exclusion of property crime 
from the model has virtually no effect on the estimate for violent 
crime (or any of the other parameter estimates for that matter). 
A second possibility is that our estimates are sensitive to 
the precise measures of crime employed. The model in col-
umn (3) replaces the total violent crime rate with those of its 
constituent subcategories: murder, rape, aggravated assault, 
and robbery. For three of these offense categories, the estimated 
hazard ratios are close to 1.00, implying no relationship to the 
activation hazard, and are statistically insignificant. The one of-
fense category showing a statistically significant correlation 
with the activation hazard is robbery. But the magnitude of the 
estimated relationship is small. It implies that a 10 percent in-
crease in the (log) rate of robbery over the sample average raises 
the hazard by 1.9 percent above the baseline hazard. 
A third concern arises from the potential relationship be-
tween crime and other controls in the model. For example, it is 
possible that border proximity and crime are correlated. If so, 
then perhaps ICE targeted high-crime areas by targeting the 
border, such that we should count the correlation between bor-
der proximity and early activation as evidence of a crime-control 
agenda. It is certainly true that agency officials, right up to Sec-
retary Napolitano, said publicly that activation along the south-
ern border would be pursued as part of a strategy to disrupt vio-
lence related to international drug cartels.75 Table 3 already 
explored this possibility by testing the sensitivity of the model to 
the presence of the border location variable. Were that variable 
highly correlated with local crime rates, its presence might mask 
a link between rollout timing and crime. But the estimates in 
 
 75 See DHS, Press Release, Secretary Napolitano Announces Secure Communities 
Deployment (cited in note 49). At the level of public justification, this explanation is com-
plicated by the fact that the prioritization of border areas was not announced by Secre-
tary Napolitano until a number of months after Secure Communities’ rollout began. The 
timing of the Secretary’s statements undercuts the likelihood that the early rollout was 
designed to use border location as a proxy for crime.  
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column (2) of Table 3 suggest this is not the case. Omitting the 
border proximity variable has a negligible effect on the hazard 
ratios for the crime variables and does not elevate them to sta-
tistical significance. 
Introducing other measures potentially correlated with 
crime similarly has no effect. For example, crime rates and polic-
ing tend to move together, as jurisdictions with more severe 
crime problems react by hiring more officers. But the results in 
column (4) of Table 4 show that including a measure of officers 
per capita has no effect on the estimated hazard ratio for violent 
or property crime. Moreover, while criminologists have long ob-
served that both income levels and population density correlate 
with crime rates—in part because crime is more common in cit-
ies—their presence is not wholly responsible for the effectively 
zero estimates for the crime rates.76 As the estimates in Table 4 
show, income levels are largely unrelated to the likelihood of ac-
tivation. Population density does have a consistently positive ef-
fect, raising the possibility that the estimated relationship be-
tween crime and activation is sensitive to the inclusion of the 
control for population density, but column (5) shows that exclud-
ing the measure of population density has a modest effect on the 
estimates for the crime rates.77 When population density is ex-
cluded from the model, the estimated hazard ratios for property 
and violent crime both exceed 1.00 and attain statistical signifi-
cance. But the size of their implied effects is smaller than those 
of the demographic and border variables. Raising the (log) rate 
of property crime by 10 percent above its sample mean implies a 
5.7 percent increase in the hazard over its baseline. For violent 
crime, the comparable figure is 2.8 percent. In short, Table 4 
suggests that the basic findings in Table 3 are not sensitive to 
our choice about how to measure crime rates or to the inclusion 
or exclusion of other variables that are correlated with crime. 
Of course, as Part II’s discussion of potential hypotheses 
makes clear, simply targeting communities with high crime 
rates is not the only way that immigration agencies might have 
used Secure Communities to target crime reduction and the re-
moval of criminals. Using crime rates to set rollout strategy is 
one plausible strategy. But the agency might have preferred in 
 
 76 See, for example, Ronald W. Beasley and George Antunes, The Etiology of Urban 
Crime: An Ecological Analysis, 11 Criminology 439, 448 (1974). 
 77 Although not shown in Table 3, removing per capita income and the poverty rate 
from the model has a similar effect on the estimates for the crime rates. 
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an ideal world to prioritize rollout in areas that have both high 
crime rates and large numbers of noncitizens. If that was in fact 
the strategy, then the models in Table 3 risk understating the 
significance of crime rates for rollout timing. To test this possi-
bility directly, Table 5 adds to the baseline model from Table 3 
terms that interact both the Hispanic and noncitizen population 
with crime rates. 
TABLE 5.  MIXED ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY 
AND TIME-UNTIL-ACTIVATION 
County Characteristic (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Fraction of Population  
 Hispanic 
1.854** 
(0.709) 
1.854** 
(0.709) 
2.182** 
(0.554) 
2.111** 
(0.544) 
2.210** 
(0.605) 
Fraction of Population  
 Noncitizen 
0.541 
(0.715) 
0.541 
(0.715) 
0.188 
(0.231) 
0.042** 
(0.060) 
0.909 
(1.194) 
Fraction of Population Black 0.572 
(0.272) 
0.572 
(0.272) 
0.537 
(0.257) 
0.536 
(0.258) 
0.517 
(0.276) 
Log Violent Crime Rate 1.009 
(0.006) 
1.008 
(0.022) 
1.006 
(0.024) 
1.000 
(0.023) 
1.012 
(0.024) 
Log Violent Crime Rate × 
 Second Quartile of  
 Demographic 
1.015* 
(0.009) 
1.009 
(0.006) 
1.005 
(0.007) 
1.007 
(0.006) 
1.003 
(0.011) 
Log Violent Crime Rate × 
 Third Quartile of  
 Demographic 
1.032** 
(0.015) 
1.015* 
(0.009) 
1.013 
(0.011) 
1.018* 
(0.010) 
1.017 
(0.012) 
Log Violent Crime Rate × 
 Fourth Quartile of  
 Demographic  
1.039 
(0.030) — 
1.049** 
(0.015) — 
1.016 
(0.018) 
Log Violent Crime Rate × 
 75th–90th Percentile of 
 Demographic 
— 1.032** (0.015) — 
1.054** 
(0.015) — 
Log Violent Crime Rate × 
 Top Decile of Demographic — 
1.039 
(0.030) — 
1.093** 
(0.038) — 
Demographic Interacted: 
 Fraction of Population . . .  Hispanic Hispanic 
Non- 
citizen 
Non- 
citizen Black 
 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05 
 
Note: The table reports hazard ratios, with standard errors in parentheses. N = 3,077. 
Except for the interaction terms, the baseline regression in column (1) is identical to the 
baseline regression in column (1) of Table 3. Estimates for all other variables are not re-
ported in order to conserve space. 
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The models in Table 5 interact the violent crime rate with a 
series of indicator variables that identify where in the distribu-
tion of a particular demographic measure a county falls. For ex-
ample, the model in column (1) interacts the violent crime rate 
with indicators for whether a county falls within one of the top 
three quartiles of the fraction of population that is Hispanic. 
Adding these interaction terms allows us to test the hypothesis 
that ICE prioritized counties that had both very high crime rates 
and very large noncitizen populations—a sort of skimming-off-
the-cream theory of rollout. If ICE pursued such a strategy, the 
hazard ratios on the interaction terms should grow as we move 
up the demographic quartiles. In theory, the hazard ratio should 
be largest for the interaction term that reflects the highest con-
centration of the relevant demographic—here the interaction 
terms that reflect the top decile of the relevant characteristic. 
The model in column (1) offers weak support for this hy-
pothesis. The hazard ratios on the interaction terms are all 
slightly greater than 1.00, and they are larger in counties with 
proportionately larger Hispanic populations. For example, the 
hazard ratio on the interaction of violent crime with the second 
quartile of Hispanic population is 1.015, and for the top quartile, 
it is 1.039. By contrast, the main effect of the violent crime rate 
has a hazard ratio that is almost exactly 1.00, implying that 
aside from the interaction terms, varying the rate of violent 
crime has no impact on the hazard for activation. Taken at face 
value, the estimates suggest that a higher violent crime rate 
slightly accelerated the activation time in counties with a rela-
tively large Hispanic population and had almost no impact on 
the time-until-activation in other counties. Raising the (log) rate 
of violent crime by 10 percent over the sample mean implies a 
less than 1 percentage-point increase over the baseline hazard 
rate for a county with a Hispanic population in the lowest quar-
tile, but it implies a 1.8 percent increase over the baseline haz-
ard rate for a county with a Hispanic population in the highest 
quartile. The model in column (2) provides a further test by look-
ing at counties with the very highest share of Hispanic popula-
tion—counties in the top decile. Its pattern is similar to that 
seen in column (1).  
Columns (3) and (4) present estimates of analogous interac-
tions for the fraction of the population that is noncitizen, and 
here, the patterns are somewhat more pronounced. The effect of 
a higher crime rate on the activation hazard is larger when 
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noncitizens comprise a larger fraction of a county’s population. 
Again, the violent crime rate has almost no effect on the activa-
tion hazard in counties with few noncitizens. But as the share of 
noncitizens in a county grows, the impact of the violent crime 
rate on the speed of activation rises monotonically. The model in 
column (4) implies that raising the (log) rate of violent crime by 
10 percent over the sample mean in a county with a noncitizen 
population in the top decile raises the activation hazard by 4.3 
percent over the baseline hazard rate. Unlike the earlier inter-
actions with the Hispanic population, the interaction terms with 
the noncitizen population are statistically significant. These re-
sults are consistent with the hypothesis that ICE prioritized for 
activation counties with higher rates of violent crime and pro-
portionately larger noncitizen populations. 
The final column of Table 5 presents a type of placebo test. 
It includes interactions of the violent crime rate with measures 
of the fraction of a county’s residents who are black. As noted 
above, we would not expect the size of a county’s black popula-
tion to relate to the speed of activation. The estimates in column 
(5) confirm this prediction. The interactions do not correlate 
strongly with the timing of activation, and their presence has no 
effect on the estimates for the other variables. The absence of a 
correlation for these racial variables should give some confidence 
that the patterns for ethnicity and citizenship status are not 
spurious.  
The results in Table 5 lend support to the view that ICE as-
signed higher priority for activation to counties with both pro-
portionately more noncitizens and higher violent crime rates. 
While crime rates themselves do not appear to predict rollout, 
crime does matter in those areas that have large noncitizen 
populations. 
That said, it is important to note that controlling for these 
interactions does not undermine the estimated effect of other in-
fluences we identified earlier. Even in the models in Table 5, the 
fraction of the county population that is Hispanic and the prox-
imity to the southern border remain strongly related to the 
speed of activation. In fact, they remain the strongest predictors: 
the implied magnitude of these influences is much larger than 
the interaction of violent crime and the size of the noncitizen 
population. Thus, the possibility that ICE prioritized counties 
with proportionately more noncitizens and higher violent crime 
rates can explain only a part of the observed pattern of activation. 
05 COX-MILES_SYMP_FLIP (FIXED).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/3/2013 8:43 AM 
2013] Policing Immigration 129 

The most powerful explanations remain the two identified earli-
er: the county’s Hispanic population fraction and its proximity to 
the border. 
3. The politics of rollout. 
The final explanatory variables in Table 3 investigate our 
third hypothesis about the activation of Secure Communities—
that the degree of local political support is a crucial predictor of 
early activation. The large literature on cooperative federalism 
suggests that such support may be relevant. The difficulty, of 
course, is that it is hard to gauge directly which local communi-
ties favor increased immigration enforcement of this sort and 
which oppose it. We therefore test several potential measures. 
The first rough measure of local attitudes is the vote share 
the Republican presidential candidate received in the 2004 elec-
tion. At least in recent years, support for the Republican Party 
(and ideological conservatism more generally) is significantly 
correlated with opposition to immigration and support for in-
creased immigration enforcement.78 Nonetheless, Table 3 shows 
that local support for Republicans does not correlate meaning-
fully with activation. The estimates for Republican vote share 
are statistically insignificant in every regression. Moreover, if 
the point estimates were taken at face value, they would imply 
an effect opposite of the one anticipated, as the hazard ratio is 
less than 1.00 in every specification. 
A potentially more precise measure of local sentiment is a 
count of the number of anti-immigrant laws enacted locally. Ra-
ther than forcing us to rely on partisanship in the presidential 
election as a proxy, this measure permits us to observe directly 
the actions taken by local politicians that relate to immigrants 
and immigration enforcement. The tally of local anti-immigrant 
legislation was generously provided by Pham and Pham, who 
collected the information as part of a project to create an index 
capturing each state’s climate for immigrants.79 The more pre-
 
 78 See Pratheepan Gulasekaram and S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, The Importance of 
the Political in Immigration Federalism *4 (forthcoming 2013), online at http://www 
.karthick.com/workingpapers_assets/GR-submission-2-23.pdf (visited Mar 4, 2013); 
Trends in American Values: 1987–2012; Partisan Polarization Surges in Bush, Obama Years 
11–12, 20 (Pew Research Center June 4, 2012), online at http://www.people-press.org/ 
files/legacy-pdf/06-04-12%20Values%20Release.pdf (visited Mar 4, 2013). 
 79 Pham and Pham, Measuring the Climate for Immigrants (cited in note 62). The 
paper by Pham and Pham includes counts of both pro- and anti-immigrant legislation at 
the county level. We excluded the small number of local laws categorized as pro-immigrant. 
05 COX-MILES_SYMP_FLIP (FIXED).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/3/2013 8:43 AM 
130  The University of Chicago Law Review [80:87 
   
cise measure of attitudes on immigration provided by local legis-
lation also fails to correlate with activation. The hazard ratios 
are statistically insignificant in every specification and are very 
close to 1.00 in all instances. Perhaps surprisingly, the presence 
of local anti-immigrant legislation does not have a meaningful 
influence on the timing of a county’s activation. 
Nor do other potential measures of local sentiment.80 Recent 
work by political scientists suggests that communities in which 
the Hispanic population has grown most rapidly might be those 
in which a political backlash and calls for stricter immigration 
enforcement are more likely to occur.81 The equation in column 
(6) of Table 3 tests this hypothesis by including a variable for 
the change in Hispanics’ share of the population over the past 
decade. The estimated hazard ratio for this variable is statisti-
cally insignificant and, like the Republican vote share, is less 
than 1.00, contrary to the backlash hypothesis. Also, the inclusion 
of the growth measure has little effect on the estimates for the 
other variables. 
 
In addition, while their paper also includes state-level legislation, that legislation is co-
extensive with our state fixed effects and was therefore omitted. 
 80 In addition to political sentiment, we also attempted to test for local financial 
incentives. Some critics of Secure Communities have argued that local governments with 
excess jail capacity will have an incentive to participate in order to get paid for housing 
immigrant detainees identified by the program. See, for example, Chris Kirkham, Pri-
vate Prisons Profit from Immigration Crackdown, Federal and Local Law Enforcement 
Partnerships, Huffington Post (June 7, 2012), online at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2012/06/07/private-prisons-immigration-federal-law-enforcement_n_1569219.html (visit-
ed Mar 4, 2013); Jessica M. Vaughan and Russ Doubleday, Subsidizing Sanctuaries: The 
State Criminal Alien Assistance Program 1 (Center for Immigration Studies Nov 2010), 
online at http://www.cis.org/articles/2010/subsidizing-sanctuaries.pdf (visited Mar 4, 
2013). While this potential financial payoff for participating is hard to calculate—and 
many counties have complained that federal reimbursements for detention do not cover 
their costs—we examined the pattern of activations for the fifty counties with the largest 
prison systems. Within that set, counties with prisons operating below capacity activated 
a statistically insignificant twenty-six days earlier than counties with prisons operating 
at or above capacity. Nineteen counties with capacity exceeding 100 percent activated in 
an average of 565.2 days while 31 counties with less than 100 percent capacity activated 
in an average of 539.0 days. Running our basic hazard model using these fifty counties 
(and leaving out state fixed effects) yields a hazard ratio of 1.00 (standard error = 0.0086) 
for the percentage of prison capacity, which is also consistent with the presence of excess 
bed space having no effect on rollout. 
 81 See, for example, Martin Halla, Alexander F. Wagner, and Josef Zweimüller, 
Does Immigration into Their Neighborhoods Incline Voters toward the Extreme Right? 
The Case of the Freedom Party of Austria *1–3, 27 (University of Zurich Department of 
Economics Working Paper No 83, July 1, 2012), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2103623 (visited Mar 4, 2013). 
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The only potential measure of local support that does corre-
late with activation is whether a local government has a 287(g) 
cooperative enforcement agreement with the federal govern-
ment. The presence of a 287(g) agreement in a county corre-
sponds to an estimated increase in the activation hazard of 
roughly four times over the baseline hazard. That said, the rela-
tionship between 287(g) agreements and activation is far from 
clear evidence of a connection between activation and local polit-
ical support. The willingness of local law enforcement to enter 
into such an agreement may reflect local political support for in-
creased immigration enforcement—support that in turn influ-
enced activation. Alternatively, the connection between 287(g) 
agreements and activation may simply reflect operational effi-
ciency. Local police participating in the 287(g) program already 
have an established relationship with federal officials, and the 
existence of this relationship may facilitate an early activation 
of Secure Communities. 
Regardless of the political variable employed, therefore, the 
estimates for these variables provide little support for the hy-
pothesis that local political support or opposition was a factor in 
activation. There are, of course, other minor wrinkles. Some 
might argue, for example, that the border proximity variable 
should be interpreted as a political variable, as proximity to the 
border might correlate with increased local support for immigra-
tion enforcement. Certainly there are high-profile instances of 
border state politicians complaining loudly about the failure of 
federal immigration enforcement. On balance, however, the 
basic patterns in the hazard models do not provide much sup-
port for the hypothesis that political support was a crucial factor 
in Secure Communities’ rollout. 
IV.  DISCRETION, PREDICTION, AND THE FUTURE OF  
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
Immigration enforcement has long been criticized as ad hoc 
and arbitrary, with the possibility of punishment for violating the 
immigration code turning more on happenstance or the caprice of 
low-level bureaucrats rather than anything else.82 The principle 
that “like cases must be treated alike,” often taken as central to 
 
 82 For a few recent versions of this decades-long critique, see generally Daniel Kan-
stroom, Deportation Nation: Outsiders in American History (Harvard 2007); Peter H. 
Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 Colum L Rev 1 (1984). 
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the very idea of justice,83 has seemed to many to be honored only 
in the breach when it comes to immigration law. 
Whatever the historical accuracy of claims about the disor-
ganization of immigration enforcement, it is clear that today 
there is an ongoing project to systematize and centralize the ex-
ercise of discretion within the immigration bureaucracy. Per-
haps the most prominent example of this trend is President 
Obama’s announcement that his administration will not seek to 
deport many young people who came to the United States with-
out authorization as children.84 But this recent development is 
far from an election-year outlier. Instead, it is but a piece of a 
much broader effort to regulate the use of prosecutorial discre-
tion within the agencies that administer immigration policy.85 
Moreover, these efforts have deep roots in a central structural 
feature of modern immigration law. Modern immigration law ef-
fectively renders huge numbers of noncitizens presumptively de-
portable—a structural feature that delegates tremendous policy-
making authority to the executive.86 
The rollout of Secure Communities is both further evidence 
of the power of the president over immigration policy and an ad-
ditional means of centralizing the use of discretion within the 
executive branch.87 Before Secure Communities, people arrested 
by local police were screened for immigration violations in only a 
small number of communities around the country.88 Soon such 
screening will be universal. Local officials will have no power to 
pick and choose directly which arrestees get screened (though, of 
course, they do have the power to decide whom to arrest). And 
for those arrestees who are identified as potentially deportable, 
the consolidation of the screening function facilitates the more 
 
 83 David A. Strauss, Must Like Cases Be Treated Alike? *18–19 (Chicago Public Law 
and Legal Theory Working Paper No 24, May 8, 2002), online at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/ 
files/files/24.strauss.like-cases.pdf (visited Mar 4, 2013); H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 
155 (Clarendon 1961). 
 84 See Preston and Cushman, Obama to Permit Young Migrants, NY Times at A1 
(cited in note 38). 
 85 See Morton, Memorandum, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion at 4 (cited in note 37). 
 86 See Adam B. Cox and Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration 
Law, 119 Yale L J 458, 463 (2009). 
 87 See DHS, Press Release, Secretary Napolitano’s Remarks (cited in note 35) (con-
trasting Secure Communities with earlier ad hoc approaches). 
 88 See text accompanying notes 2–14. 
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uniform exercise of discretion. If DHS chooses, it can more fre-
quently ensure that like cases are treated alike.89 
These changes in immigration enforcement parallel im-
portant trends in modern criminal law. In both prosecutors’ of-
fices and law enforcement agencies, efforts are underway in 
many places to discipline the vast discretion historically held by 
the individual prosecutor and the lone cop on the beat. Promi-
nent prosecutors’ offices have begun adopting internal controls 
designed to promote the more uniform administration of jus-
tice.90 Major police forces have increasingly come to rely on data-
driven models of crime prevention and officer accountability.91 
DHS, which houses both the prosecuting arm and police force for 
immigration law, has drawn on both of these developments in 
structuring Secure Communities. 
In all of these contexts, the benefits of centralizing discre-
tion often come with hidden costs. As Bernard Harcourt and 
others have noted in the criminal context, for example, these 
more “rational” models of policing can often obscure the ways in 
which seemingly neutral rules can in practice concentrate the 
burdens of law enforcement on minority communities.92 Our 
findings about Secure Communities suggest that this may be 
precisely what happened during the program’s rollout. Early ac-
tivation under the program is highly correlated with the size of a 
county’s Hispanic population—a possibility that has been ob-
scured by both the official justifications for Secure Communities 
 
 89 We are exploring whether there is evidence that the agency is actually doing just 
this as part of our larger empirical assessment of Secure Communities. See Adam B. Cox 
and Thomas J. Miles, The Future of Immigration Federalism (on file with authors). 
 90 See Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Les-
sons from Administrative Law, 61 Stan L Rev 869, 915–21 (2009); Center on the Admin-
istration of Criminal Law, Establishing Conviction Integrity Programs in Prosecutors’ 
Offices: A Report of the Center on the Administration of Criminal Law’s Conviction Integ-
rity Project 4–5 (NYU School of Law 2012), online at http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv4/ 
groups/public/@nyu_law_website__centers__center_on_administration_of_criminal_law/ 
documents/documents/ecm_pro_073583.pdf (visited Mar 4, 2013). 
 91 The rise in the role of prediction and systematization in law enforcement has 
been documented by Bernard Harcourt, who has given it the (slightly pejorative) label 
“actuarial justice.” Bernard E. Harcourt, Against Prediction: Profiling, Policing, and 
Punishing in an Actuarial Age 2–3 (Chicago 2007). The trend has even penetrated deeply 
into pop culture, with the cult crime show The Wire revolving centrally around 
CompSTAT—a real-world data-analysis tool designed to help police departments allocate 
resources efficiently and centralize discretion within their organizations.  
 92 Id at 4–6. 
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and the less-than-transparent “risk-based” model that DHS has 
said it used to set activation priorities.93 
The tight correlation under Secure Communities between 
activation and ethnicity is obviously troubling. Nor can it be 
dismissed as an artifact of the government’s focus on the border 
or on areas containing large pockets of noncitizens. Instead, as 
the detailed analysis in Part III demonstrated, the correlation 
between activation and Hispanic population is extremely persis-
tent: it remains large and statistically significant even when we 
control for border proximity and myriad other factors on which 
the government might have relied in deciding where to target its 
limited enforcement resources. 
To be sure, our findings do not necessarily mean that those 
designing the rollout strategy engaged in racial profiling. In the 
parlance of equal protection jurisprudence, the data reveal a 
disparate impact, but cannot identify disparate treatment—the 
intentional singling out of a racial or ethnic group. Still, one can 
imagine that some might defend the resulting pattern on the 
ground that, regardless of the government’s motive, singling out 
predominantly Hispanic communities for increased immigration 
enforcement is rational because the number of immigration vio-
lators in a community is correlated with the size of the Hispanic 
population. A number of commentators have argued in other 
contexts that racial profiling is perfectly rational and should be 
lawful—so long as the government relies on accurate statistical 
generalizations about the profiled group.94 And many years ago 
the Supreme Court suggested that Hispanic ethnicity could in 
fact be used by law enforcement officers as a factor in determin-
ing whether there is reasonable suspicion that a person has vio-
lated immigration law.95 
Figuring out whether targeting Hispanic communities in 
the rollout is consistent with rational profiling, understood in 
the above sense, is well beyond the scope of this paper. We 
should note, however, that the data in our larger empirical 
 
 93 See note 44 and accompanying text. 
 94 See, for example, Heather Mac Donald, Are Cops Racist? 9–10, 28–29 (Ivan R. Dee 
2003); Frederick Schauer, Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes 18–19 (Belknap 2006). 
 95 See United States v Brignoni-Ponce, 422 US 873, 884–87 (1975) (holding that ap-
parent ethnicity could be one factor, but not the sole factor, in a stop). But see United 
States v Montero–Camargo, 208 F3d 1122, 1131–35 (9th Cir 2000) (en banc) (holding 
that Hispanic ethnicity could no longer be a factor in the reasonable suspicion calculus 
because of post-Brignoni-Ponce changes to the demography of border areas). 
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study of Secure Communities cast some doubt on such a claim.96 
For while the rollout itself correlates highly with the fraction of 
a county’s population that is Hispanic, the fraction of that coun-
ty’s submissions that yield matches against ICE’s biometric da-
tabase does not.97 In other words, “hit rates” under the program 
do not appear to correlate meaningfully with a county’s Hispanic 
population. Yet if the proportion of a county that was Hispanic 
were truly correlated with the proportion of the county that was 
in violation of immigration law, then all else equal one would 
expect hit rates to correlate with ethnicity. 
Ultimately, our aim is not to resolve fully the concerns 
raised by the pattern of Secure Communities’ rollout. Instead 
our principal goal has been descriptive—to provide the first 
large-scale empirical study of the way in which discretion has 
been wielded in the most important immigration enforcement 
initiative adopted in recent history. Our findings have important 
implications for Secure Communities itself, raising questions 
about the program’s putative focus on crime and revealing a 
troubling correlation between ethnicity and the program’s de-
ployment. More broadly, our findings highlight important simi-
larities between the structure of modern criminal and immigra-
tion enforcement, findings that we hope will spur the integration 
of scholarship on both subjects. 
 
 96 As we noted earlier, our dataset includes comprehensive statistics on the produc-
tivity of Secure Communities in each community where it was activated—including the 
number of monthly submissions, hits, arrests by ICE agents, and, ultimately, deporta-
tions. See Part III. 
 97 See Cox and Miles, The Future of Immigration Federalism (cited in note 89). 
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APPENDIX  
 TABLE 1.  SUMMARY STATISTICS OF MAIN VARIABLES 
 
Variable 
Mean 
(Standard Deviation) 
County Is on Southern Border with Mexico 
0.009 
(0.097) 
County Is on Gulf of Mexico 
0.018 
(0.133) 
Percent Population Hispanic 
0.076 
(0.127) 
Change in Percent Population Hispanic 2000–2010 
0.022 
(0.024) 
Percent Population Noncitizen 
0.027 
(0.036) 
Log Violent Crime Rate 
4.747 
(1.761) 
Log Property Crime Rate 
6.994 
(1.987) 
Log Population Density 
3.748 
(1.678) 
Log Income per Capita 
10.290 
(0.229) 
Poverty Rate 
15.099 
(6.222) 
Percent of Vote in 2004 for Republican President 
0.603 
(0.126) 
Percent Population Black 
0.090 
(0.143) 
Count of Local Anti-Immigrant Legislation 
0.040 
(0.314) 
Local 287(g) Agreement 
0.015 
(0.121) 
Log Police Officers per Capita 
2.058 
(0.646) 
 
Note: N = 3,077, except for police per capita where N = 2,827. 
